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Abstract
Manipulation, bribery, and control are well-studied ways of changing the outcome of
an election. Many voting rules are, in the general case, computationally resistant to some
of these manipulative actions. However when restricted to single-peaked electorates, these
rules suddenly become easy to manipulate. Recently, Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and
Hemaspaandra studied the computational complexity of strategic behavior in nearly single-
peaked electorates. These are electorates that are not single-peaked but close to it according
to some distance measure.
In this paper we introduce several new distance measures regarding single-peakedness.
We prove that determining whether a given profile is nearly single-peaked is NP-complete
in many cases. For one case we present a polynomial-time algorithm. In case the single-
peaked axis is given, we show that determining the distance is always possible in polynomial
time. Furthermore, we explore the relations between the new notions introduced in this
paper and existing notions from the literature.
1. Introduction
Voting is a ubiquitous method for preference aggregation and collective decision-making.
It has applications in many settings ranging from politics to artificial intelligence and fur-
ther topics in computer science (see, e.g., Ephrati & Rosenschein, 1997; Ghosh, Mundhe,
Hernandez, & Sen, 1999; Dwork, Kumar, Naor, & Sivakumar, 2001). In the presence of
huge data volumes, the computational properties of voting rules gain great importance. In
particular, it is desirable to be able to quickly determine the winner(s) of an election. On
the other hand it should be computationally hard to find strategies for dishonest behavior.
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick (1989a) were the first to study the computational aspects
of strategic behavior in elections. They defined and studied manipulation in voting, i.e., a
group of voters casts their votes insincerely in order to reach a desired outcome. Another
type of manipulative behavior is control, where an external agent makes structural changes
to the election such as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters in order to
c©2017 AI Access Foundation. All rights reserved.
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reach a desired outcome. Control has been studied first also by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick
(1992). There is also bribery, where an external agent changes some votes in order to influ-
ence the outcome of the election (see, e.g., Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, & Hemaspaandra,
2009). For an overview and many natural examples of bribery, control, and manipulation
we refer to the literature (Baumeister, Erde´lyi, Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, & Rothe,
2010; Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, & Hemaspaandra, 2010; Faliszewski & Procaccia, 2010;
Brandt, Conitzer, & Endriss, 2013; Rothe, 2015; Brandt, Conitzer, Endriss, Lang, & Pro-
caccia, 2016).
Traditionally, the complexity of such “attacks” is studied under the assumption that, in
each election, any admissible vote can occur. However, there are many elections where the
diversity of the votes is limited in the sense that there are admissible votes nobody would
ever cast. One of the best known examples is the single-peaked domain, introduced by
Black (1948). It is based on the assumption that the votes are polarized along some linear
axis and voters prefer candidates closer to their ideal candidate on this axis over candidates
farther away. The study of the computational aspects of elections with single-peaked prefer-
ences was initiated by Walsh (2007), followed by fundamental contributions by Faliszewski,
Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe (2011) and Brandt, Brill, Hemaspaandra, and
Hemaspaandra (2015). The general conclusion of these papers is that many voting problems
which are NP-hard in the general case turn out to be easy for single-peaked societies.
A recent line of research initiated by Conitzer (2009) suggests that many elections are
not perfectly single-peaked but are close to it with respect to some measure. In the work
of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra (2014) various notions of nearly single-
peaked elections were introduced and it was shown that the complexity of manipulative
actions jumps back to NP-hardness in many cases.
This paper is the first to systematically study notions of distances for nearly single-
peaked electorates. Our main contributions are:
• We introduce three new notions of nearly single-peakedness. In addition, we study
six notions that already have been defined or suggested in the literature.
• We explore connections between both existing and new notions by providing inequal-
ities. These allow one to compare these notions and better understand their relation-
ship. We also briefly discuss to which degree axiomatic properties of single-peaked
preferences transfer to nearly single-peaked preferences.
• We analyze the computational complexity of computing the distance of arbitrary
preference profiles to single-peakedness. In most cases we show NP-completeness. For
the k-candidate deletion distance, we present a polynomial-time algorithm.
• Finally, we analyze the computational complexity of the nearly single-peaked evalua-
tion problem, where the task is to compute the distance for a given axis.
1.1 Related Work
The main computational problem studied in this work is recognizing nearly single-peaked
preferences. For single-peaked preferences, the question of whether a given profile is single-
peaked has received considerable attention. Bartholdi and Trick (1986) were the first to
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prove that it requires only polynomial time to detect single-peaked preferences; their al-
gorithm based on the consecutive ones problem requires O(m2n) time for profiles with n
voters and m candidates. This runtime was improved to O(mn + m2) by Doignon and
Falmagne (1994) and finally to O(mn) by Escoffier, Lang, and O¨ztu¨rk (2008). Our work,
in contrast to these results, shows that computing the distance to single-peaked preferences
is often computationally hard. The impact of single-peaked preferences on computational
problems in social choice is generally well understood. Let us mention the work of Fal-
iszewski et al. (2011) and Brandt et al. (2015), in which the complexity of winner problems
and of strategic behavior (e.g., manipulation and control) in electorates with single-peaked
preferences is investigated. These papers do not consider nearly single-peaked preferences,
but mention them as future work.
In the context of nearly single-peaked preferences the most relevant paper is by Fal-
iszewski et al. (2014). They introduce several notions of nearly single-peakedness and ana-
lyze the complexity of bribery, control, and manipulation in nearly single-peaked elections.
Their work on manipulation and bribery has recently been extended to other voting rules
(Menon & Larson, 2016) and to other notions of distance (Erde´lyi, Lackner, & Pfandler,
2015). These papers deal with applications of nearly single-peaked electorates and assume
that the underlying axis is part of the input. Our paper, in contrast, studies the complexity
of computing an axis that minimizes the distance of a preference profile to single-peakedness.
The work of Bredereck, Chen, and Woeginger (2016) has a similar objective but is some-
what orthogonal to our paper. They study only two distance measures (Voter Deletion and
Candidate Deletion) but for a variety of domain restrictions (e.g., also the single-crossing
and group-separable domains). Their work is based on a combinatorial characterization of
domain restrictions by Ballester and Haeringer (2011) and Bredereck, Chen, and Woegin-
ger (2013). Recent work by Elkind and Lackner (2014) presents approximation and fixed-
parameter tractable (fpt) algorithms for computing such distances. Sui, Francois-Nienaber,
and Boutilier (2013) propose heuristics to compute distances to single-peakedness and its
two-dimensional analogue, 2D single-peakedness; they also perform experiments on real-
world data sets. Two further distance measures have been studied: Single-peaked width
by Cornaz, Galand, and Spanjaard (2012, 2013) and the decloning measure by Elkind,
Faliszewski, and Slinko (2012). The complexity of manipulation and control in profiles of
bounded single-peaked width has been studied by Yang and Guo (2014b) and Yang (2015).
Single-peakedness on trees (Demange, 1982) and single-peakedness on circles (Peters &
Lackner, 2017) are also generalizations of classical single-peakedness but are not directly
related to (distance based) nearly single-peakedness. Both concepts have proven to be algo-
rithmically useful in the context of multiwinner elections (Yu, Chan, & Elkind, 2013; Peters
& Elkind, 2016; Peters & Lackner, 2017). Multiwinner elections have also been studied for
single-peaked (Betzler, Slinko, & Uhlmann, 2013) and single-crossing elections (Skowron,
Yu, Faliszewski, & Elkind, 2015).
Another line of research are domain restrictions in incomplete preferences (partial or-
ders); incomplete single-peaked profiles (Lackner, 2014) and incomplete single-crossing pro-
files (Elkind, Faliszewski, Lackner, & Obraztsova, 2015) have been considered. Domain
restrictions have also been studied in dichotomous preferences (Elkind & Lackner, 2015)
and notions of single-peakedness for preferences with ties, i.e., for weak orders (Fitzsim-
mons & Hemaspaandra, 2016). Finally, we remark that single-peaked preferences have also
299
Erde´lyi, Lackner & Pfandler
been considered in the context of preference elicitation (Conitzer, 2009) and in the context
of possible and necessary winners under uncertainty regarding the votes (Walsh, 2007).
The mathematical likelihood of single-peaked preferences has been analyzed by Bruner and
Lackner (2015).
1.2 Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall some notions from voting theory
and define single-peaked profiles. In Section 3, we introduce the decision problems we are
investigating in our paper. Section 4 presents basic results regarding single-peaked profiles.
Our results on the relations between the different notions of nearly single-peakedness are
presented in Section 5. The results on the complexity of nearly single-peaked consistency
and evaluation can be found in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 provides some conclusions and
directions for future work.
2. Preliminaries
Let C be a finite set of candidates and let ≻ be a total order on C. Let P = (≻1, . . . ,≻n)
be a preference profile, i.e., a list of total orders on the candidate set C. An election is
defined as a pair E = (C,P), where C is the set of candidates and P a preference profile
on C. We say that ≻i is the vote of voter i. For simplicity we write ≻i: c1c2 . . . cm
instead of c1 ≻i c2 ≻i · · · ≻i cm. For a vote ≻i: c1c2 . . . cm let the vote ≻i : cmcm−1 . . . c1
denote the reverse vote of ≻i. For two preference profiles on the same set of candidates
P = (≻1, . . . ,≻n) and L = (≻n+1, . . . ,≻s), let (P,L) = (≻1, . . . ,≻s) define the union of the
two preference profiles. In our constructions, we sometimes insert a subset of the candidates
B ⊆ C into a vote, where we assume some arbitrary, fixed order of the candidates in B (e.g.,
≻i: c1Bc3 means that c1 is the top-ranked candidate of voter i and c3 is the last-ranked
candidate, whereas all b ∈ B are ranked between c1 and c3).
Definition 2.1. Let an axis A be a total order on C denoted by >. Furthermore, let ≻ be
a vote with top-ranked candidate c. The vote ≻ is single-peaked with respect to A if for
any x, y ∈ C, if x > y > c or c > y > x then c ≻ y ≻ x has to hold.
A preference profile P is said to be single-peaked with respect to an axis A if and only if
each vote is single-peaked with respect to A. A preference profile P is said to be single-peaked
consistent if there exists an axis A such that P is single-peaked with respect to A.
Let C ′ ⊆ C. By P[C ′] we denote the profile P restricted to the candidates in C ′.
Analogously if A is an axis on C, we denote by A[C ′] the axis A restricted to candidates in C ′.
Escoffier, Lang, and O¨ztu¨rk (2008) present an algorithm that decides whether a given
preference profile is single-peaked consistent in time O(m · n). Their algorithm improves
upon the runtime of the original algorithm by Bartholdi and Trick (1986). The correspond-
ing decision problem is defined as follows.
Single-Peaked Consistency
Given: An election E = (C,P).
Question: Is P single-peaked consistent?
300
Computational Aspects of Nearly Single-Peaked Electorates
If an axis is given additionally in the input, we have the evaluation problem. Since
Single-Peaked Consistency can be solved in O(m · n) time, so can Single-Peaked
Evaluation.
Single-Peaked Evaluation
Given: An election E = (C,P) and an axis A.
Question: Is P single-peaked with respect to A?
3. Nearly Single-Peaked Preferences
In real-world settings one has to expect a certain amount of “noise” in preference data. The
single-peakedness property is very fragile and thus susceptible to such noise. The following
example illustrates the fragility of single-peakedness: Consider the single-peaked election
consisting of two kinds of votes: abcd and dcba. Assume that both votes have been cast
by a large number of voters. This election is single-peaked only with respect to the axis
a > b > c > d and its reverse. Adding a single vote abdc destroys the single-peakedness
property although this vote is almost identical to the first kind of votes.
In this section we formally define different notions of nearly single-peakedness. All these
notions define a distance measure1 to single-peaked profiles. We will now describe them
with help of a running example and provide first (trivial) upper bounds on these distances.
The following notions of nearly single-peakedness are defined for profiles. The same
definitions also hold for elections and thus we do not strictly distinguish between elections
and profiles. Throughout the following definitions let E = (C,P) be an election and k be a
positive integer.
k-Voter Deletion (VD)
The first formal definition of nearly single-peaked societies was given by Faliszewski et al.
(2014), however the idea of removing voters that are not single-peaked dates back to
Conitzer (2009). Consider a preference profile P for which most voters are single-peaked
with respect to some axis A. The voters that are not single-peaked with respect to A
are referred to as mavericks by Faliszewski et al. (2014). The number of mavericks, i.e.,
the number of voters that have to be deleted, defines a natural distance measure to single-
peakedness. If an axis can be found for a large subset of the voters, this is still a fundamental
observation about the structure of the preference profile.
Definition 3.1 (Faliszewski et al., 2014). A profile P is k-voter deletion single-peaked with
respect to an axis A if by removing at most k votes from P one can obtain a preference
profile P ′ that is single-peaked with respect to A. Furthermore, P is k-voter deletion single-
peaked consistent if there exists an axis A such that P is k-voter deletion single-peaked with
respect to A. Let VD(P) denote the smallest k such that P is k-voter deletion single-peaked
consistent.
1. We remark that we use the words “distance” and “distance measure” with their informal meaning and
not in the mathematical sense of a metric.
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Note that VD(P) ≤ n−1 always holds. We remark that k-voter deletion single-peaked is
also referred to as k-maverick-SP (Faliszewski et al., 2014) and as k-maverick single-peaked
consistent (Erde´lyi, Lackner, & Pfandler, 2013).
Example 1. Consider an election with C = {a, b, c, d, e} and P = {≻1,≻2, . . . ,≻202}.
We define ≻1: abced, ≻2: edcab, the votes ≻3 . . . ≻102: abcde, and the remaining votes
≻103 . . . ≻202: edcba. Notice that any preference profile containing abcde and edcba may
only be single-peaked consistent with respect to the axis a > b > c > d > e and its reverse.
Since ≻1 and ≻2 are not single-peaked with respect to this axis, P is not single-peaked.
Deleting ≻1 and ≻2 yields single-peaked consistency and thus we have VD(P) = 2.
k-Candidate Deletion (CD)
As suggested by Escoffier et al. (2008), let us consider deleting candidates to obtain a single-
peaked profile. This distance measure can be particularly useful if there are candidates that
do not have “a correct place” on any axis. Examples could be candidates that are not well-
known (e.g., a new political party) or candidates that prioritize other topics than most
candidates and thereby are judged by voters according to different criteria. The votes
restricted to the remaining candidates might still have a clear and significant structure, in
particular they might be single-peaked consistent.
Definition 3.2. A profile P is k-candidate deletion single-peaked with respect to an axis
A if there exists a set C ′ ⊆ C obtained by removing at most k candidates from C such that
P[C ′] is single-peaked with respect to A. Furthermore, P is k-candidate deletion single-
peaked consistent if there exists an axis A such that P is k-candidate deletion single-peaked
with respect to A. Let CD(P) denote the smallest k such that P is k-candidate deletion
single-peaked consistent.
Note that CD(P) ≤ m− 2 always holds.
Example 1 (continued). Consider the preference profile P as defined above. Observe that
for C ′ = {b, c, d}, P[C ′] is single-peaked consistent. Deleting a single candidate does not
yield single-peaked consistency and thus CD(P) = 2.
k-Local Candidate Deletion (LCD)
Personal friendships or hatreds between voters and candidates could move candidates up
or down in a vote. These personal relationships cannot be reflected in a global axis; this
is an obstacle to single-peakedness already discussed by Conitzer (2009). To eliminate
the influence of personal relationships to some candidates we define a local version of the
previous notion. This notion can also deal with the possibility that the least favorite
candidates might be ranked without special consideration or even randomly.
We first have to define partial domains and partial profiles.
Definition 3.3. Let C be a set of candidates and A an axis on C. A vote ≻ on a candidate
set C ′ ⊂ C is called a partial vote. It is said to be single-peaked with respect to A if it
is single-peaked with respect to A[C ′]. A partial preference profile consists of partial votes.
It is called single-peaked consistent if there exists an axis A such that its partial votes are
single-peaked with respect to A.
302
Computational Aspects of Nearly Single-Peaked Electorates
Definition 3.4. A profile P is k-local candidate deletion single-peaked with respect to
an axis A if by removing at most k candidates from each vote in P we obtain a partial
preference profile P ′ that is single-peaked with respect to A. Furthermore, P is k-local
candidate deletion single-peaked consistent if there exists an axis A such that P is k-local
candidate deletion single-peaked with respect to A. Let LCD(P) denote the smallest k such
that P is k-local candidate deletion single-peaked consistent.
Note that LCD(P) ≤ m− 2 always holds.
Example 1 (continued). Note that it is sufficient to remove candidate a from vote ≻1 and
candidate e from vote ≻2 to obtain single-peaked consistency. Consequently, LCD(P) = 1.
k-Additional Axes (AA)
Another suggestion by Escoffier et al. (2008) was to consider the minimum number of
axes such that each vote is single-peaked with respect to at least one of these axes. Note
that this corresponds to partitioning the voters in such a way that each group of voters is
single-peaked. Additional Axes is particularly useful if each candidate represents opinions
on several issues (as it is the case in political elections). A voter’s ranking of the candi-
dates would then depend on which issue is considered most important by the voter and
consequently each issue might give rise to its own corresponding axis.
Definition 3.5. A profile P is k-additional axes single-peaked with respect to axes A1, . . . ,
Ak+1 if there exists a partition P1, . . . ,Pk+1 of P such that the subprofile P1 is single-peaked
consistent with respect to A1, P2 is single-peaked with respect to A2, etc. Furthermore, P is
k-additional axes single-peaked consistent if there exist k + 1 axes A1, . . . , Ak+1 such that
P is k-additional axes single-peaked with respect to A1, . . . , Ak+1. Let AA(P) denote the
smallest k such that P is k-additional axes single-peaked consistent.
Note that AA(P) < min
(
n, m!2
)
always holds. This is because the number of distinct
votes is bounded by m!2 , since at most m! distinct votes exist and each vote and its reverse
are single-peaked with respect to the same axis.
Example 1 (continued). Notice that ≻1 and ≻2 are single-peaked consistent with respect
to axis b > a > c > e > d. The remaining votes are consistent with respect to a > b > c >
d > e. Thus, one additional axis is sufficient and hence AA(P) = 1.
k-Global Swaps (GS)
There is a second method of dealing with candidates that are “not placed correctly” accord-
ing to an axis A. Instead of deleting them from either the candidate set C or from a vote,
we could try to move them to the correct position. We do this by performing a sequence of
swaps of consecutive candidates. We remark that the minimum number of swaps required
to change one vote to another is the Kendall tau distance (Kendall, 1938) of these two
votes. For example, to get from vote abcd to vote adbc, we first have to swap candidates c
and d, and then we have to swap b and d. The Global Swaps distance counts the number
of swaps globally, i.e., it considers the total number of swaps required; this is in contrast to
the Local Swaps distance. Since swaps change a vote only in a subtle way, k-global swaps
can be considered a less obtrusive notion than k-(local) candidate deletion.
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Definition 3.6. A profile P is k-global swaps single-peaked with respect to an axis A if P
can be made single-peaked with respect to A by performing at most k swaps of consecutive
candidates in the profile. Furthermore, we say that the profile P is k-global swaps single-
peaked consistent if there exists an axis A such that P is k-global swaps single-peaked with
respect to A. Let GS(P) denote the smallest k such that P is k-global swaps single-peaked
consistent.
Note that these swaps can be performed wherever we want – we can have k swaps in
only one vote, or one swap each in k votes. Since rearranging a total order to obtain any
other total order requires at most
(
m
2
)
swaps, we know that GS(P) ≤
(
m
2
)
· n.
Example 1 (continued). It is possible to make P single-peaked consistent by swapping d
and e in vote ≻1 and swapping a and b in vote ≻2. This gives GS(P) = 2.
k-Local Swaps (LS)
We can also consider a “local”, per-vote budget for swaps, i.e., we allow up to k swaps per
vote. This distance measure has been introduced by Faliszewski et al. (2014) as Dodgsonk.
Definition 3.7. A profile P is k-local swaps single-peaked with respect to an axis A if
P can be made single-peaked with respect to A by performing at most k swaps per vote.
Furthermore, P is k-local swaps single-peaked consistent if there exists an axis A such that
P is k-local swaps single-peaked with respect to A. Let LS(P) denote the smallest k such
that P is k-local swaps single-peaked consistent.
Note that LS(P) ≤
(
m
2
)
always holds.
Example 1 (continued). Since only one swap is required in ≻1 and ≻2 each, we have
LS(P) = 1.
Faliszewski et al. (2014) also introduce the PerceptionFlipk distance. An election E =
(C,P) is k-perception flip single-peaked with respect to an axis A if for every vote V in
P, the axis A can be transformed to an axis A′ by at most k swaps of consecutive candi-
dates so that V is single-peaked with respect to A′. We show in the following lemma that
PerceptionFlipk and k-Local Swaps are identical. In other words, we show that swapping
consecutive candidates in the vote or in the axis has the same “power”.
Lemma 3.8. Let E = (C,P) be an election and A an axis on C. The profile P is k-local
swaps single-peaked with respect to A if and only if P is k-perception flip single-peaked with
respect to A.
Proof. Given two total orders on the candidate set C, we define a permutation p(T1, T2)
from {1, . . . ,m} to {1, . . . ,m} as follows: i maps to j if the i-th largest element in T1 equals
the j-th largest element in T2. For T1 : bac and T2 : cab we have p(T1, T2) = 321, where
321 is a short form for the permutation {1 7→ 3, 2 7→ 2, 3 7→ 1}. Note that given a vote V
and an axis A, the vote V is single-peaked with respect to A if and only if p(A,V ) consists
of a decreasing sequence followed by an increasing sequence. (The top-ranked candidate
in V corresponds to 1 in the permutation, hence V being single-peaked with respect to A
corresponds to p(A,V ) being a V-shaped sequence.) Performing swaps in either V or A
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implies that the permutation p(A,V ) is permuted. Swapping the j-th largest and the (j+1)-
th largest element in V implies that j and j + 1 are exchanged in p(A,V ). Analogously,
swapping the i-th and (i+1)-th largest element on A implies that in p(A,V ) the elements in
position i and i+1 are exchanged. If we view a sequence of swaps as a permutation σ, then
the number of swaps is equal to the number of inversions in σ, i.e., the number of pairs i < j
with σ(i) > σ(j). In the case of swaps in the vote, the permutation σ is directly applied to
p(A,V ); in the case of swaps in the axis the inverse σ−1 is applied to p(A,V ). Consequently,
a vote V can be made single-peaked with respect to A by at most k swaps if and only if there
exists a permutation σ with at most k inversions such that σ applied to p(A,V ) consists
of a decreasing sequence followed by an increasing sequence. Analogously, an axis A can
be transformed by at most k swaps so that a vote V is single-peaked if and only if there
exists a permutation σ with at most k inversions such that σ−1 applied to p(A,V ) consists
of a decreasing sequence followed by an increasing sequence. The statement of the lemma
follows now from the well-known fact that the number of inversions in a permutation π
equals the number of inversions in π−1 and, consequently, using the inverse permutations
we can transform a series of swaps in V to a series of swaps in A – and vice versa.
k-Candidate Partition (CP)
The Candidate Partition distance is similar to Additional Axes: Whereas Additional Axes
requires a partition of votes, now we partition the set of candidates. For each candidate set
in the partition, the profile restricted this candidate set has to be single-peaked consistent.
This notion is useful, for example, in the following situation. Each candidate has an opinion
on a controversial Yes/No-issue. Depending on their own preference voters will always rank
all Yes-candidates before or after all No-candidates. It might be that when considering
only the Yes- or only the No-candidates, the election is single-peaked. Therefore, if we
acknowledge the importance of this Yes/No-issue and partition the candidates accordingly,
we may obtain two single-peaked elections.
Definition 3.9. Let C1, . . . , Ck+1 be a partition of C. A profile P is k-candidate partition
single-peaked with respect to an axis A and C1, . . . , Ck+1 if the profiles P[C1], . . . ,P[Ck+1]
are single-peaked with respect to A. Furthermore, P is k-candidate partition single-peaked
consistent if there exist an axis A and a partition C1, . . . , Ck+1 of C such that P is k-
candidate partition single-peaked with respect to A and C1, . . . , Ck+1. Let CP(P) denote
the smallest k such that P is k-candidate partition single-peaked consistent.
Note that CP(P) ≤ m2 always holds.
Example 1 (continued). We partition the candidates into C1 = {a, e} and C2 = {b, c, d}.
Notice that P[C1] is trivially single-peaked consistent because it contains only two candidates.
Furthermore, P[C2] contains only votes of the form bcd and dcb. Thus, CP(P) = 1.
We remark that k-candidate partition is related to the notion of k-peaked elections,
introduced by Yang and Guo (2014a). A profile P is k-peaked with respect to an axis A if
for every vote ≻∈ P there exists a partition C1, . . . , Ck of C that yields single-peakedness
of ≻ [Ci] with respect to A for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. In this sense, the k-peaked distance can
be considered a local variant of the k-candidate partition distance, as a different partition
can be chosen for every vote.
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k-Clones (CL)
Elkind, Faliszewski, and Slinko (2012) studied clone sets in elections. A clone set is a set
of candidates that are ranked consecutively in every vote, but not necessarily in the same
order. Clone sets can be used to obtain single-peaked profiles via decloning, i.e., clone
sets are replaced by a single candidate contained in this clone set. The distance to single-
peakedness is here the minimal number of clones that need to be removed from the election
via decloning in order to make it single-peaked.
Definition 3.10. We say that the profile P is k-clones single-peaked with respect to an
axis A, if we can obtain a set C ′ ⊆ C by removing at most k clones from C via decloning
such that the preference profile P[C ′] is single-peaked with respect to A. Furthermore, we
say that the profile P is k-clones single-peaked consistent if there exists an axis A such that
P is k-clones single-peaked with respect to A. Let CL(P) denote the smallest k such that
P is k-clones single-peaked consistent.
Note that CL(P) ≤ m− 1 always holds.
Example 1 (continued). In our example we can obtain single-peakedness by decloning {a, b}
and {d, e}. Since CD(P) = 2 and deleting candidates is more general than decloning, CL(P)
can not be less than 2. Thus, CL(P) = 2.
k-Width (WI )
Clustered single-peakedness, as introduced by Cornaz et al. (2012), is a notion strongly
related to the Clones measure (clone sets are called clusters in their paper). Given a
partition of the candidates into clone sets such that the preferences are single-peaked after
decloning, the width of a partition is the size of the largest clone set minus one. Since
there are several partitions of preferences into clone sets, the distance single-peaked Width
is defined as the minimum width among all possible partitions of candidates into clone sets.
Definition 3.11. We say that the profile P is k-width single-peaked with respect to an
axis A, if we can obtain a partition of C into clone sets C1, . . . , Cℓ such that the size of
the largest clone set is k + 1 and the profile resulting from decloning is single-peaked with
respect to A. Furthermore, we say that the profile P is k-width single-peaked consistent if
there exists an axis A such that P is k-width single-peaked with respect to A. Let WI(P)
denote the smallest k such that P is k-width single-peaked consistent.
Note that WI(P) ≤ m− 1 always holds.
Example 1 (continued). Again, partition C into the clone sets C1 = {a, b}, C2 = {c}, and
C3 = {d, e}. The resulting decloned profile is single-peaked, the size of the largest clone set
is two, and thus WI(P) = 1.
Another notion appearing in the literature is the Swoon distance introduced by Fal-
iszewski et al. (2014). A profile P is (k, k′)-Swoon with respect to A if by removing the top
k and the last k′ candidates from each vote yields a partial profile that is single-peaked with
respect to A. Due to the two parameters k and k′, this notion does not immediately yield
a clear definition of distance and hence we have excluded it from our study. Note, however,
that Local Candidate Deletion is a natural generalization of this concept.
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Decision Problems
We now introduce the decision problems we will study. We define the following problems
for X ∈ {Voter Deletion, Candidate Deletion, Local Candidate Deletion, Additional Axes,
Global Swaps, Local Swaps, Candidate Partition, Clones, Width}.
X Single-Peaked Consistency
Given: An election E = (C,P) and a positive integer k.
Question: Is P k-X single-peaked consistent?
X Single-Peaked Evaluation
Given: An election E = (C,P), a positive integer k and an axis2A.
Question: Is P k-X single-peaked with respect to A?
The complexity of these problems has not been studied with the exception of Clones
Single-Peaked Consistency andWidth Single-Peaked Consistency, both of which
are solvable in polynomial time (Elkind et al., 2012; Cornaz et al., 2013). Furthermore,
independent from our work, Bredereck et al. (2016) have shown that Voter Deletion
Single-Peaked Consistency is NP-complete. In Section 6 we will study the complexity
of these two decision problems in detail.
4. Basic Results about Single-Peaked Profiles
In this section we collect simple facts about the single-peaked restriction, which we will use
in several proofs.
Lemma 4.1. Let P be a preference profile containing the vote ≻: c1 . . . cm and its reverse
≻. Then P is either single-peaked with respect to the axis c1 > · · · > cm (and its reverse)
or it is not single-peaked at all.
Proof. Since the vote ≻ ranks cm last while the vote ≻ ranks c1 last, these candidates
have to be at the left-most and right-most position on any compatible axis. Note that c1
is the top-ranked candidate of ≻. Hence this already determines the position of all other
candidates. Consequently only two axes are possible: c1 > · · · > cm and cm > · · · > c1.
Lemma 4.2 provides an alternative characterization of single-peakedness.
Lemma 4.2. Given an election (C,P), the profile P is not single-peaked consistent with
respect to an axis A if and only if there is some voter ≻ ∈ P and three candidates ci, cj , ck ∈
C such that ci > cj > ck on axis A, and ci ≻ cj holds as well as ck ≻ cj .
Proof. Assume that P is not single-peaked consistent. Then, for each axis A, there has to
exist some voter v that is not single-peaked with respect to A. Let c be the top-ranked
candidate of voter v. Then there exist candidates c1, c2 ∈ C with either c > c1 > c2 or
2. For Additional Axes we assume that k + 1 axes A1, . . . , Ak+1 are given in the input (cf. Definition 3.5).
For Candidate Partition we assume that an axis A together with a partition C1, . . . , Ck is given in the
input (cf. Definition 3.9).
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c2 > c1 > c such that c2 ≻ c1. Depending on whether c > c1 > c2 or c2 > c1 > c we
can instantiate (ci, cj , ck) with either (c, c1, c2) or with (c2, c1, c). It is now easy to see that
ci > cj > ck, ci ≻ cj and ck ≻ cj .
Let A be an axis on C. For the converse direction assume that there is some voter v and
three candidates ci, cj , ck ∈ C such that ci > cj > ck on axis A, ci ≻ cj and ck ≻ cj . Notice
that cj cannot be the top-ranked candidate of voter v as this would contradict ci ≻ cj and
ck ≻ cj . Thus, the top-ranked candidate c lies either left or right of cj on axis A. We
consider only the first case – the other case can be dealt with analogously. It holds that
c > cj > ck. Definition 2.1 now requires c ≻ cj ≻ ck for v to be single-peaked with respect
to A. This condition is, however, violated by our assumption ck ≻ cj . Therefore P is not
single-peaked consistent.
The following observation says that any subelection of a single-peaked election is also
single-peaked.
Lemma 4.3. Let (C,P) be a given election and C ′ ⊆ C. If P is single-peaked consistent
then also P[C ′] is single-peaked consistent.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that there is some C ′ ⊆ C such that P[C ′] is not
single-peaked consistent. Let A be an arbitrary axis ordering C. By Lemma 4.2 there is
some voter ≻ ∈ P and three candidates ci, cj , ck ∈ C
′ such that ci > cj > ck on the axis
A[C ′], ci ≻ cj and ck ≻ cj . Then, however, it also holds that ci > cj > ck on the axis
A since A is an extension of A[C ′]. Therefore the right-hand side of Lemma 4.2 holds for
every axis A on C. Hence, by Lemma 4.2, P is not single-peaked consistent.
The following lemma is an immediate consequence of the single-peaked classification
theorem of Ballester and Haeringer (2011). For completeness we prove this much simpler
statement directly.
Lemma 4.4. An election (C,P) is not single-peaked if there exist three candidates c1, c2, c3∈
C and three votes V1, V2, V3 ∈ P such that, for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, ci is ranked last in Vi[{c1, c2, c3}].
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that for any axis A on {c1, c2, c3} with candidate ci in
the middle, vote Vi is not single-peaked with respect to A. Hence, by Lemma 4.3, (C,P) is
not single-peaked.
5. Relations between Notions of Nearly Single-Peakedness
Theorem 5.1 states inequalities that hold for the distance measures under consideration. We
hereby show how these measures relate to each other. For an overview consult Figure 1: In
this Hasse diagram one distance measure X is above and connected to a distance measure
Y if the measure Y can be bounded by a function of measure X. Intuitively, distances
at the top are more fine-grained notions. More formally, Figure 1 displays a partial order
defined as follows. For two distances measures X and Y , Y ≤ X if and only if there exists
a function f such that Y (P) ≤ f(X(P)) for any profile P.
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Figure 1: The relation of distance measures (cf. Theorem 5.1). This Hasse diagram shows
a partial order defined as Y ≤ X if and only if Y can be bounded by a function
of X.
Theorem 5.1. Let (C,P) be an election. Then the following inequalities hold:
(1) LS(P) ≤ GS(P). (5) VD(P) ≤ GS(P). (9) CP(P) ≤WI(P).
(2) LCD(P) ≤ CD(P). (6) AA(P) ≤ VD(P). (10) CD(P) ≤ CL(P).
(3) CD(P) ≤ GS(P). (7) CP(P) ≤ CD(P). (11) WI(P) ≤ CL(P).
(4) LCD(P) ≤ LS(P). (8) CP(P) ≤ LS(P). (12) AA(P) ≤ (6 · CL(P))!.
This list is complete in the following sense: Inequalities that are not listed here and that do
not follow from transitivity do not hold in general.
Proof. Inequalities 1 and 2 are immediate consequences from the definitions since LS per-
mits more swaps than GS and LCD is more flexible than CD . Inequalities 3 and 4 are due
to the fact that swapping two candidates in a vote is at most as effective as removing one of
these candidates. Similarly, for Inequality 5 observe that removing the corresponding voter
is at least as effective as swapping two candidates in the vote. Concerning Inequality 6
observe that instead of deleting a voter we can always add an additional axis for this voter.
Inequality 7 follows from the fact that putting each deleted candidate in its own partition
leads to single-peakedness if deleting these candidates does.
In order to show Inequality 8 let P be k-local swaps single-peaked consistent. This
means that there exists an axis A such that after performing at most k swaps per voter,
P becomes single-peaked with respect to A. Without loss of generality assume that the
axis A is c1 > c2 > · · · > cm. We now partition the candidates in k + 1 sets S0, . . . , Sk.
This is done by putting the i-th largest element of A into the (i modulo k + 1)-th set.
Since we assume that A is c1 > c2 > · · · > cm, we can equivalently say that ci is put
into the (i modulo k + 1)-th set, i.e., the c1 in S1, the c2 in S2, the ck in Sk and ck+1 in
S0. Let S ∈ {S0, . . . , Sk}. Towards a contradiction assume that P[S] is not single-peaked
with respect to A[S]. By Lemma 4.2 there exists some voter ≻ ∈ P and three candidates
cx, cy, cz ∈ C with x < y < z, cx ≻ cy and cz ≻ cy. On axis A the distance between
cx and cy respectively cy and cz is at least k + 1, i.e., at least k elements lie in between
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them. We know that at most k swaps in ≻ can make this vote single-peaked with respect
to A. Let ≻′ denote this swapped vote. Necessarily, these swaps have to either cause that
cy ≻
′ cy−1 ≻
′ · · · ≻′ cx+1 ≻
′ cx holds or that cy ≻
′ cy+1 ≻
′ · · · ≻′ cz−1 ≻
′ cz holds in ≻
′
(depending whether the top-ranked candidate of ≻′ is right or left of cy). Let us focus on
the case that the swaps ensure that cy ≻
′ cy−1 ≻
′ · · · ≻′ cx+1 ≻
′ cx – the other case is
analogous. For ≻, contrary to ≻′, it holds that cx ≻ cy. Hence these swaps have to cause
that cy ≻
′ cx holds. In addition, at least k elements, namely cx+1, . . . , cy−1, have to be in
between them. This requires at least k + 1 swaps which contradicts the fact that at most
k swaps suffice. Therefore, for all partition sets S, P[S] is single-peaked consistent and
CP(P) ≤ LS(P).
To prove Inequality 9, consider a partition into clone sets. If we partition C in sets so
that every set contains at most one element from each clone set, then we obtain a partition
consisting of WI(P) + 1 sets, since the original partition consisted of sets with at most
WI(P) + 1 elements. The given profile is WI(P)-candidate partition single-peaked with
respect to this partition and hence CP(P) ≤WI(P).
Inequality 10 is an immediate consequence of the definitions since removing clones is a
restricted form of deleting candidates. To see Inequality 11 note that CL is the total number
of candidates removed via decloning whereas WI only measures the number of candidates
removed in the largest clone set.
For Inequality 12, let C ′ be the reduced candidate set obtained by decloning and let A′
be an axis such that P[C ′] is single-peaked with respect to A′. We will show that by building
upon A′ we can construct an axis compatible with all votes that order certain candidates
(namely D1 ∪D2, as defined below) in the same way. Let D1 be the set of all candidates
appearing in clone sets of size at least 2 and let D2 be the set of all right and left neighbors
on A′ of candidates in D1 ∩ C
′. To bound the size of D1 observe that in every clone set of
size c exactly c− 1 candidates are decloned and for c ≥ 2 it holds that c ≤ 2(c− 1). Thus,
we can bound |D1| ≤ 2 · CL(P). Since D2 contains at most twice as many candidates as
D1, it holds that |D2| ≤ 4 · CL(P). Hence, |D1 ∪D2| ≤ 6 · CL(P) and the total number of
permutations on D1 ∪D2 is bounded by (6 · CL(P))!.
For each possible permutation of D1 ∪ D2 we consider a separate axis, i.e., two votes
share the same axis only if they agree on the order of all candidates in D1 ∪D2. Let T be a
fixed order on D1 ∪D2; we write a ≻T b to compare two candidates with respect to T . We
intend to build an axis that is compatible with all votes agreeing with T on the order of
candidates in D1∪D2. This is done as follows: Let C
′′ be a clone set and d its representative
on A′, i.e., d is the unique candidate in C ′′ that has not been decloned. Further let c and e
be the elements left and right of d on A′, respectively. We replace the contiguous sequence
c > d > e of A′ with c > T [C ′] > e if c ≻T d and with c > T [C ′] > e if d ≻T c, i.e., the
elements of C ′ are ordered descending (ascending) according to T if c is larger (smaller)
than d in all votes compatible with T . We repeat this procedure for all clone sets and obtain
an axis A for C that witnesses single-peakedness for all votes compatible with T .
To see that this is the case, we employ Lemma 4.2: Assume towards a contradiction
that there is some voter ≻ in P and three candidates ci, cj , ck ∈ C such that ci > cj > ck
on axis A, and ci ≻ cj holds as well as ck ≻ cj . If the representatives of ci, cj , and ck
are all different, then also the representatives violate the single-peaked condition, which
contradicts our assumption that A′ is a single-peaked axis for all representatives. If ci, cj ,
310
Computational Aspects of Nearly Single-Peaked Electorates
V
D
(P
)
C
D
(P
)
L
C
D
(P
)
G
S
(P
)
L
S
(P
)
A
A
(P
)
C
P
(P
)
C
L
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Voter Deletion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .VD (P) = 1 4 ≤ 4 1 1 9 9
Candidate Deletion . . . . . . . . . . . CD (P) 3 = 4 ≤ 4 3 3 ≤ 11
Local Candidate Deletion . . . LCD (P) 3 ≤ = ≤ ≤ 3 3 ≤ 11
Global Swaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GS (P) 2 2 2 = 4 2 2 9 9
Local Swaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .LS (P) 2 2 2 ≤ = 2 2 ≤ 11
Additional Axes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .AA (P) ≤ 5 5 ≤ 6 = 5 ≤ 11
Candidate Partition . . . . . . . . . . .CP (P) 8 ≤ 7 ≤ ≤ 8 = ≤ ≤
Clones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CL (P) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 = 12
Width . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .WI (P) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 ≤ =
Table 1: Inequalities regarding the distance measures. This table should be read as follows.
Measures in the left-most column are bounded (≤) by a function of the measures
in the top row. Numbers point to the corresponding counterexample if no such
bound exists.
and ck all have the same representative, then we obtain a contradiction to our assumption
that ci ≻ cj and ck ≻ cj from the fact that either ci ≻ cj ≻ ck (or the reverse) holds in
all votes compatible with T . If ci, cj, and ck have two representatives in total, we can
assume without loss of generality that cj and ck share the same representative (i.e., they
are in the same clone set), since if ci and ck are in the same clone set then also cj is
in this clone set. (The case where ci and cj share the same representative is analogous.)
Observe that {cj , ck} ⊆ D1 and hence ci ∈ D2. Thus the order of these three candidates
is determined by T and therefore the same in all votes under consideration. Furthermore,
cj and ck are consecutive in T since they are in the same clone set and hence, due to our
assumption that ci ≻ cj and ck ≻ cj , the only possibility to order the three candidates is
ci ≻ ck ≻ cj. This, however, implies that either ci > ck > cj or the reverse holds on A by
our construction, a contradiction. Therefore, we conclude that all votes compatible with T
are single-peaked with respect to our constructed axis A, and consequently, we can bound
AA(P) ≤ (6 · CL(P))!.
It remains to show that the inequalities listed in the theorem statement are indeed
all inequalities that hold for these measures. To this end we provide counterexamples for
each remaining case of the following form: To show that measure X cannot be bounded
measure Y, we present a sequence of elections with arbitrary large X and constant Y. In these
sequences of elections either the number of votes n or the number of candidates m (or both)
is growing. Table 1 offers an overview by pointing to the corresponding counterexample.
Counterexample 1 (VD cannot be bounded by CD, AA and CP): Consider the preference
profile on the candidate set C = {c1, . . . , cm} with the following 2m votes:
• There are m votes of the form: c1 c2 . . . cm.
• There are m votes of the form: cm c2 c3 . . . cm−1 c1.
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The corresponding preference profile P is not single-peaked consistent. This is because
c2 has to be next to both c1 and cm on any suitable axis but both have to be either the
left-most or right-most element. Consequently, VD(P) = m. Removing candidates instead
of voters is far more useful in this case. When we remove either c1 or cm, P becomes single-
peaked and hence CD(P) = 1. Since we have only two distinct votes, we require two axes
to make P single-peaked and hence AA(P) = 1. Furthermore, notice that we can obtain
single-peaked consistency by partitioning the candidates into two sets C1 = {c1, cm} and
C2 = {c2, . . . , cm−1}, hence CP(P) = 1.
Counterexample 2 (Neither GS nor LS can be bounded by VD, AA, CD, LCD and CP):
This counterexample is similar to the previous one but P consists of only two votes. Let
C = {c1, . . . , c3m+1} be the set of candidates.
• There is one vote of the form: c1 c2 . . . c3m+1.
• There is one vote of the form: c3m+1 c2 c3 . . . c3m c1.
If we consider P [{c1, cm+1, c2m+1, c3m+1}], we observe that this restricted profile is not
single-peaked. Consequently, by Lemma 4.3, P is not single-peaked as well. If we want
to make P single-peaked via swaps, at least two of {c1, cm+1, c2m+1, c3m+1} have to swap
position. This requires at leastm swaps and consequently GS(P) ≥ LS(P) ≥ m. Since there
are only two votes, AA(P) = VD(P) = 1. As in the previous counterexample removing
either c1 or c3m+1 yields a single-peaked profile and hence LCD(P) = CD(P) = CP(P) = 1.
Counterexample 3 (Neither CD nor LCD can be bounded by VD, AA and CP): This time
we consider three votes on the candidates C = {c1, . . . , c2m}.
• There is one vote ≻1 of the form: c1 c2 . . . c2m.
• There is one vote ≻2 of the form: c2m c2m−1 . . . c1.
• There is one vote ≻3 of the form: cm . . . c1 cm+1 . . . c2m.
By Lemma 4.1 we only have to consider the axis c1 > c2 > · · · > c2m for P =
(≻1,≻2,≻3). The third vote ≻3 is however not single-peaked with respect to this axis.
Hence VD(P) = AA(P) = 1. Also, we have that CP(P) = 1 since P[{c1, . . . , cm}] and
P[{cm+1, . . . , c2m}] are single-peaked consistent. However, we have to remove a lot of can-
didates to obtain a single-peaked profile. Indeed, we have to remove candidates such that
the indices of the remaining candidates in ≻3 are either increasing or decreasing. That are
at least m− 1 to remove and hence CD(P) ≥ LCD(P) ≥ m− 1.
Counterexample 4 (Neither VD, GS nor CD can be bounded by LCD and LS): We consider
an election with 3n votes on the candidates C = {c1, . . . , c3n}.
• There are n votes ≻1, . . . ,≻n of the form: c1 c2 . . . c3n.
• There are n votes ≻n+1, . . . ,≻2n of the form: c3n c3n−1 . . . c1.
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• The remaining votes are obtained from the first vote by swapping the last two candi-
dates in the i-th block consisting of three candidates. Formally, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
there is a vote ≻2n+i of the form: c1 . . . c3(i−1)−1 c3(i−1) c3(i−1)+2 c3(i−1)+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i-th block
c3i . . . c3n.
Let P = (≻1,≻2, . . . ,≻3n). By using Lemma 4.4 it is easy to check that for each
1 ≤ i ≤ n, P[{c3(i−1)+2 , c3(i−1)+1, c3i}] is not single-peaked consistent. By Lemma 4.3,
P is not single-peaked consistent. Also, this implies that we have to remove at least one
candidate in each set {c3(i−1)+2, c3(i−1)+1, c3i} in order to make P single-peaked consistent.
Therefore CD(P) ≥ n. Since GS(P) ≥ CD(P) also GS(P) ≥ n. We now want to prove a
lower bound on VD(P). If we delete n − 1 votes then at least one vote of {≻1, . . . ,≻n},
one of {≻n+1, . . . ,≻2n} and one of {≻2n+1, . . . ,≻3n} remains. Again by Lemma 4.3 and
4.4, P is not single-peaked consistent. Hence VD(P) > n− 1. Finally, notice that the votes
≻2n+1, . . . ,≻3n can be turned into vote ≻1 by a single swap, which shows that LS(P) = 1.
Since LCD(P) ≤ LS(P) also LCD(P) = 1.
Counterexample 5 (AA cannot be bounded by CD, LCD and CP): In this example we use
n votes on the candidates C = {c1, . . . , cn+1}.
• For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one vote ≻i of the form:
cn+1 ci ci−1 . . . c1 ci+1 ci+2 . . . cn.
Let us consider the preference profile P = (≻1,≻2, . . . ,≻n). All votes have the same
top-ranked candidate but different candidates in the second place. If this preference profile
was single-peaked then these second-place candidates had to be either left or right of the
peak. This is not possible for three or more candidates. Hence the profile P containing
three or more votes is not single-peaked. Thus, AA(P) ≥ n3 − 1. Deleting cn+1 however
makes P single-peaked with respect to the axis c1 > c2 > · · · > cn and hence CD(P) =
LCD(P) = CP(P) = 1.
Counterexample 6 (AA cannot be bounded by LS): We consider n votes on 4n candidates
C = {c1, . . . , c4n}.
• For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there is one vote ≻i of the form:
c1 . . . c4i−4 c4i c4i−2 c4i−1 c4i−3 c4i+1 . . . c4n.
Let P = (≻1, . . . ,≻n). The preference profile P is not single-peaked consistent since
the restricted profiles P[{ci−3, ci−2, ci−1, ci}], i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, are neither. With five swaps in
each vote we can make these votes identical and hence LS(P) ≤ 5. Even any pair of votes
in P is not single-peaked. Hence AA(P) ≥ n2 .
Counterexample 7 (CP cannot be bounded by LCD): Consider an election with 3n votes on
the candidates C = {c1, . . . , c3n}.
• For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3n, there is one vote ≻i of the form:
c1 . . . ci−1 ci+1 . . . c3n ci.
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Let P = (≻1, . . . ,≻3n). Since the lowest ranked candidates have to be either at the
left-most or right-most position on the axis and there are more than two lowest ranked
candidates, this profile is not single-peaked consistent. However, when the last-ranked
candidate is removed in each vote, the profile becomes single-peaked consistent and hence
LCD(P) = 1. Concerning CP(P), notice that any partition into n sets contains a set
with at least three candidates and thus, by Lemma 4.4 does not yield a single-peakedness.
Hence n candidate partitions are not enough to obtain single-peaked consistency and hence
CP(P) ≥ n.
Counterexample 8 (CP cannot be bounded by VD and AA): Consider the candidate set
C = {c1, . . ., cm2} and the following three votes:
• There is one vote ≻1 of the form: c1 c2 . . . cm2 .
• There is one vote ≻2 of the form: cm2 cm2−1 . . . c1.
• There is one vote ≻3 of the form:
c1 cm+1 c2m+1 . . . cm(m−1)+1 c2 cm+2 . . . cm(m−1)+2 . . . cm c2m c3m . . . cm2 .
Let P = (≻1,≻2,≻3). This preference profile is not single-peaked but VD(P) = 1 and
AA(P) = 1. The candidates, however, have to be partitioned into many sets in order to
obtain single-peakedness. First, observe that by Lemma 4.1 we only have to consider the
axis c1 > c2 > · · · > cm2 . Let us now consider vote ≻3. Since we have fixed an axis we
can consider longest increasing and decreasing subsequences in this vote. Note that both
increasing and decreasing subsequences have a length of less than 2m. Hence a subset
of the candidates cannot be single-peaked if it contains more than 4m candidates. We
therefore have to partition the candidates of P into sets of cardinality at most 4m and by
that CP(P) ≥ m4 − 1.
Counterexample 9 (VD and GS cannot be bounded by CL and WI): This counterexample
uses 3n votes and three candidates.
• There are n votes are of the form: c1 c2 c3.
• There are n votes are of the form: c1 c3 c2.
• There are n votes are of the form: c2 c3 c1.
Since all three candidates appear at the last position in votes, n votes have to be deleted
to make this profile single-peaked. Analogously, at least n swaps have to be performed. Since
{c2, c3} can be decloned, CL and WI can be bounded by 1.
Counterexample 10 (Neither WI nor CL can be bounded by GS, LS, CP, CD, VD, AA, and
LCD): Consider an election with four votes and m candidates.
• There is one vote ≻1 of the form: c1 c2 . . . cm.
• There is one vote ≻2 of the form: cm cm−1 . . . c1.
• There is one vote ≻3 of the form: c1 c2 . . . cm−2 cm cm−1.
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• There is one vote ≻4 of the form: cm−1 cm−2 . . . c1 cm.
Let P = (≻1, . . . ,≻4). Since P has three distinct last-ranked candidates, it is not single-
peaked. Swapping candidates cm−1 and cm in ≻3 provides us with a single-peaked profile
according to axis c1 > c2 > · · · > cm, thus GS(P) = 1. Let us consider CL and WI .
There are three last-ranked candidates: c1, cm−1 and cm. At least two of them have to be
contained in a clone set. As can easily be verified, such a clone set would have to be of size
at least m. Hence, CL(P) ≥ WI(P) ≥ m − 1. Since GS is an upper bound for LS , CP ,
CD , VD , AA, and LCD , none of them can bound WI or CL.
Counterexample 11 (Neither CD, LCD, GS nor LS can be bounded by WI): We consider
an election with three votes and 2m+ 1 candidates.
• There is one vote ≻1 of the form: c1 c2 . . . c2m+1.
• There is one vote ≻2 of the form: c2m+1 c2m . . . c1.
• There is one vote ≻3 of the form: c2 c1 c4 c3 . . . c2m−2 c2m−3 c2m c2m−1 c2m+1.
Every candidate with an odd index is part of a valley, i.e., with respect to the axis fixed
by ≻1 and ≻2 all candidates with odd indices are ranked below their two neighbors with
respect to ≻3. Hence LCD is at least m and by the Inequalities 2, 3 and 4 so are CD , GS
and LS . On the contrary, if we put, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, c2i and c2i−1 in a clone set, we
obtain a single-peaked profile. Since all these clone sets are of size 2, WI is bounded by 1.
Counterexample 12 (CL cannot be bounded by WI): Let C = {c1, . . . , c3m}. We define
3m votes that are contained in P. For every sequence s of length m on the alphabet
{X,Y,Z} we define a vote. The i-th entry of s determines the order of c3i−2, c3i−1, c3i. If
s[i] = X then we choose the order c3i−2 ≻ c3i−1 ≻ c3i. If s[i] = Y then we choose the order
c3i−2 ≻ c3i ≻ c3i−1. If s[i] = Z then we choose the order c3i−1 ≻ c3i ≻ c3i−2. The vote
corresponding to s is now defined as
{c1, c2, c3} ≻ {c4, c5, c6} ≻ · · · ≻ {c3m−2, c3m−1, c3m}
and the order in these sets is given by the sequence s and the rules as defined above.
We have to remove m candidates to make this profile single-peaked, i.e., CD(P) = m.
By Inequality 10, CL(P) ≥ m. In contrast, grouping c3i−2, c3i−1, c3i together in clone sets
(for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}) and decloning accordingly yields a single-peaked profile and hence
WI(P) is bounded by 2.
We conclude this section by illustrating how the inequalities stated in Theorem 5.1 can
be used to obtain new results. More specifically, we will show that there are preference
profiles that are close to being single-peaked but do not have a weak Condorcet winner –
in contrast to single-peaked profiles for which a weak Condorcet winner is guaranteed. A
weak Condorcet winner is a candidate that is preferred to each other candidate by at least
half of the voters.
Proposition 5.2. For every m ≥ 3 and n ≥ 1 there is an election E = (C,P) with 2n+ 1
votes and m candidates such that GS(P) = 1, CL(P) = WI(P) = 2 and P does not have a
weak Condorcet winner.
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Proof. Let the set of candidates be C = {a, b, c} ∪ {d1, . . . , dm−3}. The profile P contains
the following votes:
• a single vote of the form: b c a d1 . . . dm−3,
• n votes of the form: a b c d1 . . . dm−3, and
• n votes of the form: c a b d1 . . . dm−3.
It is straightforward to verify that the profile P does not have a weak Condorcet winner
since it contains a cycle on a, b, c. Notice that P becomes single-peaked with respect to axis
b > a > c > d1 > · · · > dm−3 if we swap candidates b and c in the first vote. Hence, we
know that GS(P) = 1. Furthermore, we obtain a single-peaked profile via decloning the
clone set {a, b, c} and consequently CL(P) = WI(P) = 2.
Due to the inequalities stated in Theorem 5.1, the result of Proposition 5.2 holds also if
GS(P) is replaced by one of the measures VD , CD , LCD , LS , AA, and CP . (In principle
these measures could be smaller than GS but the profile is not single-peaked and the
distance is only 1.) Therefore, even a distance of 1 to single-peakedness (with respect to
the VD , CD , LCD , LS , AA, CP , and GS ) does not help to avoid the Condorcet paradox.
Let us now briefly consider profiles with CL(P) = 1 or WI(P) = 1. In contrast to
our previous result, such profiles preserve an important property of single-peaked profiles,
namely that weak Condorcet winners are guaranteed.
Proposition 5.3. An election E = (C,P) with CL(P) = 1 or WI(P) = 1 has a weak
Condorcet winner.
Proof. If this statement holds for WI(P) = 1, it also holds for CL(P) = 1 since all profiles
with CL(P) = 1 satisfy WI(P) = 1. Let C1, . . . , Ck be a partition of candidates into clone
sets so that decloning these sets yields a single-peaked profile. Let C ′ be the corresponding
set of decloned candidates, i.e., P[C ′] is single-peaked. Let w be a weak Condorcet winner
of P[C ′] and let w ∈ Ci. Observe that |Ci| ≤ 2 since WIP = 1. For all candidates c ∈ C \Ci
and all candidates d ∈ Ci, d is preferred to c by at least half the voters of P. If Ci = {w}, w
is a weak Condorcet winner in P. If |Ci| = 2 and the number of voters is odd, one of these
two candidates is preferred over the other by more than half of the voters in P; hence this
preferred candidate is a weak Condorcet winner. If |Ci| = 2 and the number of voters is
even, either one of these two candidates is preferred over the other by more than half of the
voters in P and thus is a weak Condorcet winner or these two candidates are preferred over
each other by exactly half of the voters, hence they are both weak Condorcet winners.
6. Computational Results
In this section we study the complexity of X Single-Peaked Consistency andX Single-
Peaked Evaluation for X ∈ {Voter Deletion, Candidate Deletion, Local Candidate
Deletion, Additional Axes, Global Swaps, Local Swaps, Candidate Partition}. The gen-
eral theme is that X Single-Peaked Consistency is NP-complete whereas X Single-
Peaked Evaluation is solvable in polynomial time. The exception is the Candidate
Deletion distance, for which also the consistency problem requires only polynomial time.
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We do not consider consistency problems corresponding to the Clones and Width distance
as it was already established that these are solvable in polynomial time (Elkind et al., 2012;
Cornaz et al., 2013).
6.1 Hardness Results
We start with the complexity analysis of voter deletion single-peaked consistency. In the
reduction we are going to cascade two or more preference profiles. The following definition
captures this operation.
Definition 6.1. Let (C1,P1) and (C2,P2) be two elections with C1∩C2 = ∅. Furthermore,
let P1 = (≻
′
1, . . . ,≻
′
n) and P2 = (≻
′′
1 , . . . ,≻
′′
n). We define P1 ≻ P2 = (≻1, . . . ,≻n), where
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n the total order ≻i is defined by
c ≻i c
′ iff (c, c′ ∈ C1 and c ≻
′
i c
′) or (c, c′ ∈ C2 and c ≻
′′
i c
′) or (c ∈ C1 and c
′ ∈ C2).
Note that P1 ≻ P2 is always a preference profile on C1 ∪ C2.
Lemma 6.2. Let (C1,P1) and (C2,P2) be two elections with C1 ∩ C2 = ∅. Assume that:
• P1 and P2 are single-peaked consistent with respect to the axes A1 and A2, respectively.
• The votes in P2 have at most 2 distinct top-ranked candidates.
• These (two) top-ranked candidates are adjacent on the axis A2.
Then P1 ≻ P2 is single-peaked.
Proof. We are going to construct an axis A in a way that P1 ≻ P2 is single-peaked with
respect to A. First we split A2 in two parts A
′
2 and A
′′
2 . If P2 contains votes with two
distinct top-ranked candidates (which have to be adjacent), we split A2 in between these
two candidates. If all votes in P2 share the same top-ranked candidate, we split A2 left of
this candidate (this is arbitrary). The new axis A is A′2 followed by A1 and then A
′′
2 , i.e.,
A′2 > A1 > A
′′
2. The correctness proof of this construction is straightforward.
Before we start with the hardness proof, let us first make the following observation.
Observation 6.3. We are given a set of candidates C = {a, b, c, d} and the following three
votes: ≻d: acbd, ≻e: cbda, and ≻ne: dcba. Then the preference profile (≻d,≻e) is single-
peaked with respect to the axis a > c > b > d and (≻e,≻ne) is single-peaked with respect to
the axis d > c > b > a. The profile (≻d,≻ne) is not single-peaked consistent
3.
We now show NP-hardness via a reduction from the clique problem, a well-known NP-
complete problem. We remark that the following result has been proven independently by
Bredereck et al. (2016) in a more general form that also applies to domain restrictions other
than single-peakedness.
3. Indeed, (≻d,≻ne) corresponds to an α-configuration in Ballester and Haeringer’s (2011) characterization
of the single-peaked domain and thus cannot be single-peaked consistent.
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Clique
Given: A graph (VG, EG) and a positive integer s.
Question: Does (VG, EG) contain a clique of size s, i.e., has the graph (VG, EG) an induced
subgraph of size s that is complete?
Theorem 6.4. Voter Deletion Single-Peaked Consistency is NP-complete.
Proof. To show hardness we reduce from Clique. Let VG = {v1, . . . , vn}. Each vertex vi
has four corresponding candidates c1i , . . . , c
4
i . We consequently have C = {c
1
1, . . . , c
4
1, c
1
2, . . . ,
c42, . . . , c
1
n, . . . , c
4
n}. The votes directly correspond to vertices and thus P = (≻1, . . . ,≻n).
In order to define the votes we introduce three functions creating partial votes. For
a, b, c, d ∈ C, let fd(a, b, c, d) = acbd, fe(a, b, c, d) = cbda, and fne(a, b, c, d) = dcba. If we
consider fd, fe and fne as votes then by Observation 6.3 (fd, fe) and (fe, fne) are single-
peaked consistent but (fd, fne) is not. Next we define a function p(i, j), mapping a pair in
{1, . . . , n}2 to a total order on {c1j , . . . , c
4
j}.
p(i, j) =


fd(c
1
j , c
2
j , c
3
j , c
4
j ) if i = j,
fe(c
1
j , c
2
j , c
3
j , c
4
j ) if {i, j} ∈ EG,
fne(c
1
j , c
2
j , c
3
j , c
4
j ) if {i, j} /∈ EG.
The intuition behind function p(i, j) is to encode a row of the adjacency matrix of G as
a vote in the preference profile P. To this end, we put in “cell” (i, j) the result of fe if there
is an edge between i and j. If there is no edge between i and j, then we put the result of
fne in cell (i, j). In the special case i = j (we are in the diagonal of the matrix) we put the
result of fd in the cell.
Let the partial profiles representing the columns of the adjacency matrix be defined as
Pj = (p(1, j), . . . , p(n, j)), for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. We are now going to define the preference profile
P = (≻1, . . . ,≻n) by P = P1 ≻ P2 ≻ · · · ≻ Pn.
To conclude the construction let E = (C,P) and k = n − s, i.e., we are allowed to
delete k voters from E in order to obtain a single-peaked profile. The intention behind the
construction is that the voters in a single-peaked profile will correspond to a clique. We
claim that G has a clique of cardinality s if and only if it is possible to remove at most k
voters from P in order to make the resulting preference profile single-peaked consistent.
“⇒” Assume that there is a clique I = {≻i1 , . . . ,≻is} with |I| = s. Let P
′ = (≻i1
, . . . ,≻is). Thereby we keep only those voters whose corresponding vertices are contained
in the clique I. Observe that the election E′ = (C,P ′) can be obtained by deleting k = n−s
voters from the profile P. It remains to show that P ′ is indeed single-peaked consistent.
Let Ci = {c
1
i , c
2
i , c
3
i , c
4
i } for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Since I is a clique, for each ≻x,≻y ∈ I, x 6= y,
there is an edge {x, y} ∈ EG. Thus, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, P
′[Ci] either contains only
instantiations of fd and of fe (if ci is in the clique) or only contains fe and fne (if ci is not in
the clique). By Observation 6.3, we conclude that P ′[Ci] is single-peaked consistent. Now
we intend to use Lemma 6.2 to show that also P ′ is single-peaked. Note that P ′[Ci] contains
at most two distinct top-ranked candidates. In addition, these two top-ranked candidates
are adjacent on the axis which gives single-peaked consistency, as can be seen as follows:
Consider again Observation 6.3. For (fd, fe) the top-ranked candidates a and c are adjacent
on the axis a > c > b > d. The same holds for (fe, fne) with axis d > c > b > a and c, d
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as top-ranked candidates. Since all conditions of Lemma 6.2 are fulfilled, we can apply it
iteratively. Therefore, P ′[C1] ≻ P
′[C2], (P
′[C1] ≻ P
′[C2]) ≻ P
′[C3], etc. are single-peaked
consistent and hence also P ′ is single-peaked consistent.
“⇐” Assume that E∗ = (C,P∗) is an election that has been obtained from E by deleting
at most k voters from P such that P∗ is single-peaked. Then there exists also an election
E′ = (C,P ′) which is obtained from E by deleting exactly k voters from P such that P ′ is
single-peaked. This is because deleting additional voters from a single-peaked profile can
never break single-peakedness. Consequently P ′ contains s votes. Let i1, . . . , is ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that P ′ = (≻i1 , . . . ,≻is). We claim that the vertices {vi1 , . . . , vis} form a clique in G.
As before, let Ci = {c
1
i , c
2
i , c
3
i , c
4
i } for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By Lemma 4.3 we know that for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, P ′[Ci] is single-peaked consistent. Then, by Observation 6.3, each column
must not contain an instance of fd together with an instance of fne. Let j ∈ {i1, . . . , is}.
Observe that by construction vote ≻j contains an instance of fd on candidate set Cj .
Consequently, all other votes in P ′ have to be instantiations of fe on Cj and thus vertex vj
is adjacent to all other vertices in {vi1 , . . . , vis}. Since j is arbitrary, the vertices vi1 , . . . , vis
form a clique.
We now turn to additional axes single-peaked consistency. Here we make use of a
similar construction as presented in Theorem 6.4 with the difference that we now show
NP-hardness via a reduction from the partition into cliques problem (Karp, 1972; Garey &
Johnson, 1979).
Partition Into Cliques
Given: A graph (VG, EG) and a positive integer s.
Question: Is it possible to partition VG into s sets such that each set of vertices induces a
clique on (VG, EG)?
Theorem 6.5. Additional Axes Single-Peaked Consistency is NP-complete.
Proof. Hardness is shown by a reduction from Partition Into Cliques. For the reduction
we use the same transformation as presented in the proof of Theorem 6.4 to obtain an
election. Then we set k = s − 1, i.e., we are searching for a partition of the voters into s
disjoint sets such that each of the partitions is single-peaked consistent. Due to the one-
to-one correspondence between voters and vertices we can use the partition of the vertices
to obtain a partition of the voters and vice versa. With arguments similar to the proof of
Theorem 6.4 one can show that a set of vertices is a clique if and only if the corresponding
profile is single-peaked consistent.
Remark 6.6. The Partition Into Cliques problem is NP-complete even when one is
asked to partition the graph into three cliques. Consequently it follows from the proof of
Theorem 6.5 that Additional Axes Single-Peaked Consistency is NP-complete even
for k = 2, i.e., for deciding single-peaked consistency with two additional axes.
In the proofs of our next two results, we will provide reductions from the NP-complete
Minimum Radius problem (Frances & Litman, 1997). It is defined as follows:
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Minimum Radius
Given: A set of strings S ⊆ {0, 1}ℓ and a positive integer s.
Question: Has S a radius of at most s, i.e., is there a string α ∈ {0, 1}l such that each
string in S has a Hamming distance to α of at most s?
Theorem 6.7. Local Candidate Deletion Single-Peaked Consistency is NP-
complete.
Proof. For proving hardness, we reduce from the Minimum Radius problem. Let S ⊆
{0, 1}ℓ and s a positive integer. Given a string β ∈ S, let β(i) denote the bit value at
the i-th position in β. We are going to construct an LCD Single-Peaked Consistency
instance. Each string in S = {β1, . . . , βn} will correspond to two voters. Each bit of the
strings will correspond to two candidates. In addition, we have 2ℓs + 2 extra candidates.
Consequently, we have C = {c11, c
2
1, c
1
2, c
2
2, . . ., c
1
ℓ , c
2
ℓ , c
′
1, . . . , c
′
ℓs+1, c
′′
1 , . . . , c
′′
ℓs+1}.
We define the preference profile with the help of two functions creating total orders.
f0(a, b) = ab f1(a, b) = ba
The vote ≻j, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is of the form
≻j: c
′
1 . . . c
′
ℓs+1 fβj(1)(c
1
1, c
2
1) fβj(2)(c
1
2, c
2
2) . . . fβj(ℓ)(c
1
ℓ , c
2
ℓ ) c
′′
1 . . . c
′′
ℓs+1.
The preference profile P is now defined as (≻1, . . . ,≻n,≻1, . . . ,≻n). We claim that (C,P)
is s-local candidate deletion single-peaked consistent if and only if S has a radius of at most
s.
“⇐” Suppose that S has a radius of at most s, i.e., there is a string α ∈ {0, 1}ℓ with
Hamming distance at most s to each β ∈ S. We consider the following axis A:
c′1 > · · · > c
′
ℓs+1 > fα(1)(c
1
1, c
2
1) > fα(2)(c
1
2, c
2
2) > · · · > fα(ℓ)(c
1
ℓ , c
2
ℓ ) > c
′′
1 > · · · > c
′′
ℓs+1.
We claim that P is single-peaked with respect to A after deleting at most s candidates in
each vote. The deletions for vote ≻j, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, are the following: We delete candidate
c1i in ≻j if and only if α(i) 6= βj(i). The deletions in ≻j are exactly the same as in ≻j.
These are at most s deletions since the Hamming distance between α and every β ∈ S is at
most s. After these deletions all votes are either subsequences of A or its reverse. Hence
we obtain a single-peaked consistent profile.
“⇒” Let P ′ be the partial, single-peaked consistent profile that was obtained by deleting
at most s candidates in each vote. First, note that some c′ ∈ {c′1, . . . , c
′
ℓs+1} has not been
deleted in any vote since in total at most ℓ · s different candidates can be deleted. In the
same way let c′′ ∈ {c′′1 , . . . , c
′′
ℓs+1} be a candidate that has not been deleted in any vote. Now
let us consider the profile P ′[{c′, c′′, c1i , c
2
i }] for any i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}. We claim that α ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ,
defined in the following way, has a Hamming distance of at most s to all bitstrings in S.
α(i) =


0 if P ′ contains a vote with c′c1i c
2
i c
′′,
1 if P ′ contains a vote with c′c2i c
1
i c
′′,
1 otherwise.
320
Computational Aspects of Nearly Single-Peaked Electorates
First, observe that Case 1 and 2 cannot occur at the same time since then P ′ would not be
single-peaked consistent.
Let βj ∈ S, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Note that if at any position i, βj(i) 6= α(i) then either c
1
i or
c2i had to be deleted in the vote ≻j. Otherwise P
′ would not be single-peaked consistent.
Hence |{i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} | α(i) 6= βj(i)}| ≤ s because otherwise we would require more than s
candidate deletions in the corresponding vote ≻j . Hereby we have shown that the Hamming
distance of α and βj is at most s.
Theorem 6.8. Local Swaps Single-Peaked Consistency is NP-complete.
Proof. We use the same construction as in the proof of Theorem 6.7. It holds that (C,P)
is s-local swaps single-peaked consistent if and only if S has a radius of at most s. This can
be shown similarly to the proof of Theorem 6.7 except that we swap candidates instead of
deleting them.
The following problem will be useful for showing NP-hardness of Global Swaps
Single-Peaked Consistency. Given two votes, ≻x and ≻y, let swaps(≻x,≻y) denote
the minimum number of swaps of adjacent candidates needed to make ≻x and ≻y equal,
i.e., swaps(≻x,≻y) is the Kendall tau distance of ≻x and ≻y.
Kemeny Optimal Aggregation
Given: An election (C,P), with P = (≻1, . . . ,≻n), and an integer s.
Question: Is there a vote ≻∗ on C such that
∑
1≤i≤n swaps(≻i,≻
∗) ≤ s.
Kemeny Optimal Aggregation was shown to be NP-complete (Bartholdi, Tovey, &
Trick, 1989b). Later, this result was strengthened to require only four voters (Dwork et al.,
2001; Biedl, Brandenburg, & Deng, 2009).
Theorem 6.9. Global Swaps Single-Peaked Consistency is NP-complete.
Proof. We show NP-hardness of this problem by reduction from Kemeny Optimal Ag-
gregation. Let an instance of Kemeny Optimal Aggregation be given by C =
{c1, . . . , cm}, P = (≻1, . . . ,≻n), and s. We define k, the number of allowed swaps, be
defined as 2s. Then we create a new election (C ′,P ′) with C ′ = C ∪ {ctop1 , . . . , c
top
2k+1,
clast1 , . . . , c
last
2k+1}, i.e., |C
′| = m+4k+2. For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} we create two votes ≻′i and
≻′i as follows. The vote ≻
′
i ranks c
top
1 first, followed by c
top
2 , c
top
3 , . . ., c
top
2k and finally c
top
2k+1.
Then it ranks the candidates in C in the same order as ≻i does. Finally, it orders the candi-
dates clast1 . . . c
last
2k+1 with descending preference, i.e., c
last
2k+1 being the last-ranked candidate.
Vote ≻′i is the reverse of ≻
′
i. The preference profile P
′ is now defined as (≻′1,≻
′
1, . . . ,≻
′
n,≻
′
n).
We refer to ≻′1, . . . ,≻
′
n as the non-reversed votes and to ≻
′
1, . . . ,≻
′
n as the reversed votes.
We claim that (C ′,P ′) is k-global swaps single-peaked consistent if and only if (C,P) and
s are a yes-instance of the Kemeny Optimal Aggregation problem.
“⇒” Suppose that (C ′,P ′) is k-global swaps single-peaked consistent. Therefore, one
can obtain a profile PS from P ′ by applying at most k = 2s swaps such that PS is single-
peaked consistent with respect to an axis A. Since there are 2k + 1 candidates in the set
{ctop1 , . . . , c
top
2k+1} at least one of them must have remained in place in each vote. Analogously,
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the same holds for one of the candidates contained in the set {clast1 , . . . , c
last
2k+1}. Let ctop and
clast denote these two candidates. From Lemma 4.3 we know that P
S [{ctop, c1, . . . , cm, clast}]
is single-peaked consistent as well. Observe that all non-reversed votes in PS [{ctop, c1, . . . ,
cm, clast}] have ctop as top-ranked candidate and clast as last candidate, while in all reversed
votes clast is top and ctop is the last-ranked candidate. By Lemma 4.1 all non-reversed votes
in PS [{c1, . . . , cm}] must be ordered in the same way and the reversed votes in exactly
their reverse order. We denote this ordering of {c1, . . . , cm} by ≻
∗. Notice that turning
the non-reversed votes into ≻∗ requires the same number of swaps as turning the reversed
votes into ≻∗. Therefore, k2 = s swaps are sufficient to turn all non-reversed votes into
≻∗. Taken together, ≻∗ fulfills all properties to be a yes-instance of the Kemeny Optimal
Aggregation problem.
“⇐” Assume (C,P) and s describe a yes-instance of the Kemeny Optimal Aggre-
gation problem. Then there is some common ordering ≻∗, which has in total a swap
distance of ≤ s to all votes in P. Then, (C ′,P ′) is k-global swaps single-peaked consis-
tent with respect to the axis ctop1 > c
top
2 > · · · > c
top
2k+1 > [c1, . . . , cn as ordered by ≻
∗] >
clast1 > c
last
2 > · · · > c
last
2k+1. This is because all votes can be brought into the form
ctop1 ≻ c
top
2 ≻ · · · ≻ c
top
2k+1 ≻ [c1, . . . , cn as ordered by ≻
∗] ≻ clast1 ≻ c
last
2 ≻ · · · ≻ c
last
2k+1
or its reverse by using at most k = 2s swaps – s swaps for the non-reversed and s swaps for
the reversed votes.
Remark 6.10. Since Kemeny Optimal Aggregation with only four voters is NP-
complete (Dwork et al., 2001), it follows from the proof of Theorem 6.9 that Global
Swaps Single-Peaked Consistency is NP-complete even for eight voters.
6.2 A Polynomial-Time Algorithm for Candidate Deletion Single-Peaked
Consistency
In contrast to the previous hardness results, we are able to show that Candidate Deletion
Single-Peaked Consistency can be decided in polynomial time. The algorithm builds
upon the O(n ·m) time algorithm for testing single-peaked consistency by Escoffier, Lang
and O¨ztu¨rk (2008). Since we make some modifications to the algorithm and also for the
sake of completeness we present it here as well.
For the remainder of this section let (C,P) be an election with n voters and C =
{c1, . . . , cm}.
6.2.1 The Single-Peaked Consistency Algorithm
The algorithm presented here is a modified version of the algorithm by Escoffier et al.
(2008). It tests whether a given profile is single-peaked consistent and thus does not consider
candidate deletions. Before we start with presenting the algorithm, let us fix some notation.
Definition 6.11. For C ′ ⊆ C, let L(P, C ′) denote the set of last-ranked candidates in
P[C ′].
Definition 6.12. An incomplete axis is a total order on a subset of C with a marked
position that indicates where further elements may be added. We denote this position by a
star symbol, e.g., the incomplete axis c1 > c2 > ⋆ > c3 allows additional candidates to be
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added right of c2 and left of c3. We write |A| to denote the number of candidates on an
incomplete axis A. The boundary of an incomplete axis A, boundary(A), is a quadruple
consisting of the two candidates left of the star and the two candidates right of the star, e.g.,
boundary(c1 > c2 > ⋆ > c3 > c4 > c5) = (c1, c2, c3, c4). If only one or no candidates exist
left/right of the star, the corresponding entries in the quadruple are ǫ, e.g., boundary(c1 >
⋆) = (ǫ, c1, ǫ, ǫ).
Given an incomplete axis A and a candidate set C, an axis A′ extends A if A′ can be
constructed from A′ by adding elements left or right of the ⋆ symbol.
The algorithm proceeds iteratively by placing the last-ranked candidates that have not
yet been placed. Let C ′ ⊆ C be the set of candidates that have not yet been positioned on
the (incomplete) axis A. The algorithm checks what kind of constraints follow from each
vote. If these constraints do not contradict each other, the set of last-ranked candidates
L(P, C ′) is placed. We denote this procedure by place(A,X) where X = L(P, C ′). The
procedure place(A,X) returns either a new incomplete axis (extending A by the candidates
in X) or the value inconsistent. The algorithm repeatedly invokes place until all elements
have been placed or a contradiction has been found.
Now we describe place(A,X) in detail since it is also used by our candidate deletion
algorithm. Let boundary(A) = (b′1, b1, b2, b
′
2), i.e., the current incomplete axis A is given as
· · · > b′1 > b1 > ⋆ > b2 > b
′
2 > · · · . If a condition contains a boundary element and this
element is ǫ (i.e., it does not exist), corresponding constraints can be ignored. The following
cases are considered for each vote ≻i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Case 1: |L(P, C ′)| ≥ 3. There are three or more candidates that would have to be placed
at the positions next to b1 and b2. Since this is not possible, P is not single-peaked
consistent; place returns inconsistent.
Case 2: L(P, C ′) = {x1, x2}. The candidates x1 and x2 have to be placed at the positions
next to b1 and next to b2.
(a) b1 ≻i x1 and b2 ≻i x1: This case cannot occur since x1 is ranked below b1 and
b2 and thus cannot be placed after b1 and b2.
(b) x1 ≻i b1 and x1 ≻i b2: There are no constraints for x1 that follow from ≻i.
(c) b2 ≻i x1 and x2 ≻i x1: In this case x1 has to be placed next to b1 and therefore
x2 is placed next to b2.
(d) b1 ≻i x1 and x2 ≻i x1: In this case x1 has to be placed next to b2 and therefore
x2 is placed next to b1.
All these rules are also applicable if x1 and x2 are interchanged.
Case 3: L(P, C ′) = {x}. The candidate x has to be placed either at the position next b1
or b2. It is important that if x is the last candidate to be placed, it can be placed
either next to b1 or next to b2.
(a) b1 ≻i x and b2 ≻i x: This case cannot occur since x is ranked below b1 and b2
and thus cannot be placed after b1 and b2.
(b) x ≻i b1 and x ≻i b2: There are no constraints for x.
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(c) b2 ≻i x: In this case x has to be placed left, i.e., next to b1.
(d) b1 ≻i x: Then x has to be placed right, i.e., next to b2.
In addition to these three cases, the following constraint is applicable independently of the
cardinality of L(P, C ′). Let x ∈ L(P, C ′).
Case 4: If b′1 ≻i b1 and x ≻i b1, or if b
′
2 ≻i b2 and x ≻i b2, then the candidates b
′
1, b1, x
or x, b2, b
′
2, respectively, violate the single-peaked condition (cf. Lemma 4.2). Thus
place returns inconsistent.
For each vote ≻i, these case distinctions yield constraints on placing the candidates
in X. If there is a way to place the candidates in X that is compatible with every vote,
place(A,X) has been successful and returns the new incomplete axis. (If there is more than
one possibility to place the candidates in X, place chooses arbitrarily.) Otherwise the value
inconsistent is returned. To simplify the notation, we define place(A, ∅) to return A.
As mentioned before, the place procedure described here is similar to the procedure
used in the original single-peaked consistency algorithm by Escoffier et al. (2008). The
main difference is that the original single-peaked consistency algorithm places all remaining
candidates at once as soon there is only one possibility left; place continues to place at most
two candidates in each step. In particular, this necessitates Case 4, which did not appear
in the original algorithm.
The following lemma shows that the place procedure is indeed correct; the proof can be
found in the appendix.
Lemma 6.13. Let (C,P) be an election. If the iterative application of place yields an axis A,
then (C,P) is single-peaked with respect to A. If at some point place returns inconsistent,
then (C,P) is not single-peaked.
The following observation is the main reason why we can employ dynamic programming
in our algorithm for deciding the Candidate Deletion Single-Peaked Consistency
problem.
Observation 6.14. The place(A,X) procedure places the candidates in X on the incomplete
axis A only by considering boundary(A) and thus place does not depend on the full incomplete
axis A.
6.2.2 The Candidate Deletion Algorithm
Observation 6.14 states that the (at most) four boundary candidates of an incomplete axis
fully determine whether and which further candidates can be placed on the axis. The main
idea of our algorithm is to store only incomplete axes that differ in these four candidates,
i.e., only incomplete axes with differing boundaries. If two axes with the same boundary are
considered, we take the axis with the larger cardinality, i.e., the one with more candidates
placed on it. This strategy allows us to use a dynamic programming approach.
Our algorithm resembles the previously described single-peaked consistency algorithm
in that it places last-ranked candidates first. However, since we are allowed to delete can-
didates, our algorithm does not terminate if at some point three or more last-ranked candi-
dates are encountered (cf. Case 1 in the single-peaked consistency algorithm). Nevertheless,
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Algorithm 1: Polynomial-time algorithm for k-candidate deletion single-peaked con-
sistency – Theorem 6.16
1 S0[ǫ, ǫ, ǫ, ǫ, ∅]← ⋆ // S0 contains the empty incomplete axis
2 for i = 1 . . . m do
3 Si ← Si−1
4 foreach incomplete axis A ∈ Si−1 do
5 Let (c1, c2, c3, c4, Y ) be the key of A. // i.e., Si−1(c1, c2, c3, c4, Y ) = A
6 foreach X ∈ N(i, Y ) do
7 Anew ← place(A,X)
8 if Anew 6= inconsistent then
9 if Si[c1, c2, c3, c4,X] is empty then
10 Si[c1, c2, c3, c4,X]← Anew
11 else
12 if |Anew| > |Si[c1, c2, c3, c4,X]| then
13 Si[c1, c2, c3, c4,X]← Anew
14 return an axis A in Sm with maximum |A|
our algorithm utilizes the place procedure and thus can place at most two candidates in
each step (cf. Lemma 4.4). Candidates that would violate the single-peaked condition are
not actively deleted but rather cannot be successfully placed.
We now describe the algorithm in more detail (cf. Algorithm 1). The algorithm’s main
data structure is an associative array S containing incomplete axes. The axes are indexed
by quintuples (c1, c2, c3, c4, Y ) where c1, c2, c3, c4 ∈ C and Y ⊆ {c2, c3}, i.e., such quintuples
constitute keys for S. The associative array my contain at index (c1, c2, c3, c4, Y ) only an
incomplete axis A with boundary(A′) = (c1, c2, c3, c4). Furthermore, the candidates in Y
have been placed most recently on A; this can either be {c2}, {c3} or {c2, c3}. We write
S[c1, c2, c3, c4, Y ] to denote the entry S with key (c1, c2, c3, c4, Y ).
We start with S0 containing only the empty incomplete axis ⋆. (Recall that ⋆ marks
the position where new candidates can be added to the axis.) We write N(i, Y ) to denote
the set containing all X ⊆ C that may be placed on A in step i of the algorithm; we will
define N(i, Y ) after an overview of the algorithm. Note that at most two of the candidates
can be placed and hence 1 ≤ |X| ≤ 2. So, in step i = 1, for every axis A ∈ S0 (only ⋆) and
every set of candidates X ∈ N(1, Y ), we use the place procedure to place the candidates in
X on A. This step gives rise to new incomplete axes. These new axes as well as those in
S0 are stored in S1.
For i = 2, we continue by placing the candidates in N(2, Y ) for every incomplete axis
A ∈ S1. Again this creates new incomplete axes, which we store in S2 (in addition to
elements from S1). At this point, it might be that S2 already contains an entry with the
same key. In this case, we keep the axis with more candidates placed on it. We repeat
this procedure until we have considered the sets in N(m,Y ). The associative array Sm now
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contains a several incomplete axes; we output a cardinality maximal axis as it requires the
minimum number of candidate deletions.
Let us now define N(i, Y ).
Definition 6.15. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let Li = L (P, C \ (L1 ∪ · · · ∪ Li−1)). Further, fix
1 ≤ i ≤ m and let Y be the candidates last placed on the incomplete axis. We define
N(i, Y ) to be the set of all X ⊆ Li ∪ · · · ∪ Lm satisfying the following conditions:
(i) 1 ≤ |X| ≤ 2
(ii) X ∩ Li 6= ∅
(iii) L(P,X) = X
(iv) if Y 6= ∅ then L(P, Y ∪X) = Y
Note that
⋃
i∈{1,...,m} Li = C and that some Li’s may be empty (more precisely, there
might exist some index j ≤ m such that Lj, . . . , Lm are empty). The conditions can be
intuitively understood as follows: Condition (i) is a necessity if we want to obtain a single-
peaked axis: No more than two last-ranked candidates may be placed on the axis. Condition
(ii) is mostly important for showing runtime bounds. Note that condition (iii) implies that
if X = {x1, x2}, then there must be a vote ≻i with x1 ≻i x2 and a vote ≻j with x2 ≻j x1.
If one candidate would always be ranked below the other, the former had to be placed first
and the second only in a later step. Condition (iv) guarantees that the candidates in X are
never ranked below Y . Candidates that are below Y cannot be placed anymore, i.e., they
have been deleted.
Intuitively, the correctness of Algorithm 1 rests on two pillars. First, we have observed
that the place procedure only considers the four boundary elements of an incomplete axis.
Hence, it is correct to identify incomplete axes with the same boundary. Since we search for
a cardinality maximal axis, we can safely pick a larger axis if we have the choice (cf. Lines 12
and 13). Second, the correctness of the algorithm relies fundamentally on the correctness
of the place procedure, which we have shown in Lemma 6.13. We will now formally prove
the runtime bounds and correctness of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 6.16. Candidate Deletion Single-Peaked Consistency can be solved in
time O(n ·m6).
Proof. The runtime bound can be seen as follows. The sets L1, . . . , Lm can be computed
in O(m · n) time. The associative array Si uses quintuples (c1, c2, c3, c4, Y ) as keys, where
Y ⊆ {c2, c3} Hence Si contains at most 4m
4 entries. Let us now bound the size of N(i, Y ).
The singleton sets in N(i, Y ) are subsets of Li. Two-element sets in N(i, Y ) contain one
element of Li and one of Li ∪ · · · ∪ Lm. Thus, |N(i, Y )| ≤ |Li|+m|Li| = (m+ 1)|Li|. The
place procedure is executed in step i of the algorithm for every axis in Si−1 and element
of N(i, Y ), i.e., at most 4m4(m + 1)|Li| times. If we add up over all iterations we obtain∑m
i=1 4m
4(m+ 1)|Li| = 4m
4(m+ 1) ·
∑m
i=1 |Li| = O(m
6) procedure calls. Since place has a
runtime of O(n), we require in total O(n ·m6) time for place calls. Furthermore, N(i, Y )
has to be computed for every axis under consideration. It is straight-forward to verify that
N(i, Y ) can be computed inO(n·m·|Li|) time: At most (m+1)|Li| sets have to be considered
and the conditions of Definition 6.15 can be verified in O(n) time. Again, adding up over
all iterations we obtain a runtime of O(
∑m
i=1m
4nm|Li|) = O(nm
5 ·
∑m
i=1 |Li|) = O(nm
6),
also within the desired time bound.
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Let us now prove correctness. For the one direction, let A be a cardinality maximal axis
returned by the algorithm. Furthermore, let X1, . . . ,Xm be the set of candidates placed in
each step of the algorithm to obtain axis A. In particular, this implies that A is a total
order on X1 ∪ · · · ∪ Xm. Since some of those sets may be empty, let X
′
1, . . . ,X
′
ℓ be the
selection of non-empty sets. Let P ′ = P[X ′1 ∪ · · · ∪ X
′
m]. Our goal is to show that P
′ is
single-peaked with respect to A and we intend to apply Lemma 6.13 to prove this.
To do so, we will first show for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, that L(P ′,X ′i ∪ · · · ∪ X
′
ℓ) = X
′
i.
We prove this statement by induction. In the following we write N(·, Y ) and by that
omit the first parameter, as the exact step at which a candidate was placed is irrelevant
for our argument. Observe that X ′ℓ ∈ N(·,X
′
ℓ−1) since X
′
ℓ has been placed on A and
X ′ℓ−1 has been placed on A before that. Thus the conditions listed in Definition 6.15
apply to X ′ℓ. In particular L(P
′,X ′ℓ) = X
′
ℓ holds due to condition (iii), which serves as
our base case. For the induction step, assume that L(P ′,X ′i+1 ∪ · · · ∪ X
′
m) = X
′
i+1. We
want to show that L(P ′,X ′i ∪ · · · ∪ X
′
m) = X
′
i. Note that for arbitrary X
′,X ′′ it holds
that L(P ′,X ′ ∪ X ′′) = L(P ′,X ′ ∪ L(P ′,X ′′)). Thus, by our hypothesis, we know that
L(P,X ′i ∪ · · · ∪X
′
m) = L(P,X
′
i ∪X
′
i+1). Since X
′
i+1 ∈ N(·,X
′
i), condition (iv) yields that
L(P,X ′i ∪X
′
i+1) = X
′
i.
It follows now immediately from Lemma 6.13 that P ′ is single-peaked with respect to A:
We have shown that Algorithm 1 first computes place(∅,X ′1) with X
′
1 = L(P
′,X ′1∪· · ·∪X
′
m).
Then place is applied on the resulting axis and X ′2 = L(P
′,X ′2 ∪ · · · ∪ X
′
m) is placed on
it. This procedure is repeated until we obtain axis A and Lemma 6.13 applies. Thus,
(P ′,X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xm) is single-peaked with respect to A.
For the other direction, let C ′ be a cardinality maximal subset of candidates such that
P ′ = P[C ′] is single-peaked. Our goal is to show that Sm contains an axis with the same
cardinality as C ′. Let Xi = L (P
′, C ′ \ (X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xi−1)) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m and X0 =
∅. Further let ℓ be the largest index such that Xℓ 6= ∅. Let us consider Xi and let
s(i) = min{1 ≤ j ≤ m : x ∈ Xi and x ∈ Lj}. Our first goal is to show that Xi ∈
N(s(i),Xi−1). To show this we have to check the conditions in Definition 6.15. First,
Xi ⊆ Ls(i) ∪ · · · ∪ Lm by definition of s(i). Condition (i) holds since P[C
′] is single-
peaked (cf. Lemma 4.4). Condition (ii) holds also by choice of s(i). Condition (iii) holds
because Xi = L (P
′, C ′ \ (X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xi−1)) = L (P
′,Xi ∪ · · · ∪Xℓ) and thus also Xi =
L (P ′,Xi). Finally, condition (iv) holds because Xi−1 = L (P
′, C ′ \ (X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xi−2)) =
L (P ′,Xi−1 ∪ · · · ∪Xℓ) and thus also Xi−1 = L (P
′,Xi−1 ∪Xi).
Let us assume that the place procedure is applied to P ′. First X1 is placed, then X2,
etc. Let A1, . . . , Aℓ be the corresponding incomplete axes. Furthermore let A0 be the empty
incomplete axis, X0 = ∅ and s(0) = 0. We are going to show that for every 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, there
exists an incomplete axis A′i ∈ Ss(i) such that boundary(A
′
i) = boundary(Ai) and |A
′
i| ≥ |Ai|.
We prove this statement by induction. For i = 0, note that A0 = ⋆ ∈ S0. For the induction
step, assume that A′i ∈ Ss(i) such that boundary(Ai) = boundary(A
′
i) and |Ai| = |A
′
i|.
By our previous argument, it holds that Xi+1 ∈ N(s(i + 1),Xi). Since A
′
i ∈ Ss(i), we
compute place(A′i,Xi+1). By Observation 6.14, place(A
′
i,Xi+1) is successful (i.e., it does not
return inconsistent) if and only if place(Ai,Xi+1) is successful since both have the same
boundary. Let A′i+1 be the axis returned by place(A
′
i,Xi+1). Then |Ai+1| = |A
′
i+1| since in
both cases the same candidates have been placed. Also boundary(Ai+1) = boundary(A
′
i+1),
again by Observation 6.14. If A′i+1 is stored in Si+1, we have proven the induction step. If
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it is not stored, then there exists an A∗i+1 in Si+1 with boundary(Ai+1) = boundary(A
∗
i+1)
and |A∗i+1| ≥ |Ai+1|. Also in this case the induction statement holds.
We have shown that there exists an incomplete axis A′ℓ ∈ Ss(ℓ) such that boundary(Aℓ) =
boundary(A′ℓ) and |A
′
ℓ| ≥ |Aℓ|. If such an element exists in Ss(ℓ), it does exist in Sm. Since
|Aℓ| = |C
′|, we have shown that the algorithm returns an axis of maximum cardinality.
Finally, let us remark that very recently a modification of this algorithm has been
proposed (Przedmojski, 2016) that improves the runtime to O(n ·m3).
6.3 Complexity of Nearly Single-Peaked Evaluation
In the previous sections we have analyzed the computational complexity of the X Single-
Peaked Consistency problem. We now turn to the computational complexity of the
related X Single-Peaked Evaluation problem, where the axis is additionally given
in the input. Due to this additional information, all X Single-Peaked Evaluation
problems are solvable in polynomial time – in contrast to the consistency problems studied
in the Section 6.1.
Let us first prove that the candidate deletion evaluation problem is solvable in polyno-
mial time, as it is the case for the corresponding consistency problem.
Proposition 6.17. Candidate Deletion Single-Peaked Evaluation can be solved
in time O(n ·m6).
Proof. Let A be the given axis and P the profile for which we want to verify whether it
is single-peaked with respect to A. Let P ′ be the profile obtained from P by adding two
votes, ≻1= A and ≻2= A, where A denotes the reverse of axis A. By Lemma 4.1, P
′
is k-X single-peaked consistent if and only if P is k-X single-peaked with respect to A.
By Lemma 4.3, the same statement holds if P and P ′ are restricted to candidate subsets.
Thus, applying the candidate deletion algorithm of Section 6.2 to P ′ yields the same result
as solving the evaluation problem for P and A.
We now turn to evaluation problems where their corresponding consistency problems
are NP-hard.
Proposition 6.18. Voter Deletion Single-Peaked Evaluation can be solved in time
O(n ·m).
Proof. Whenever a vote is not single-peaked consistent with respect to A, we have to delete
it. If at most k votes have to be deleted, we know that the profile is k-voter deletion
single-peaked consistent with respect to A.
Proposition 6.19. Additional Axes Single-Peaked Evaluation can be solved in
time O(k · n ·m).
Proof. Recall that for this evaluation problem all axes are given. Hence it suffices to verify
that every vote is single-peaked with respect to at least one of the given k + 1 axes.
Theorem 6.20. Local Candidate Deletion Single-Peaked Evaluation can be
solved in time O(n ·m2 · logm).
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Proof. For every vote ≻ ∈ P we have to find the minimum number of candidates that have
to be deleted. We do this by iterating over all candidates p ∈ C and calculating a cardinality
maximal C ′ ⊆ C such that ≻ [C ′] is single-peaked with respect to the given axis A and p
is top-ranked in ≻ [C ′]. For each p, let C1 be the set of candidates containing p and all
candidates left of p on A. We have to find a (not necessarily contiguous) subsequence of
A[C1] of maximum length that is increasing with respect to ≻ and contains p. Let C
′
1 be the
set of candidates contained in this maximum increasing subsequence. Then, let C2 be the
set of candidates containing p and all candidates right of p. We search for a subsequence of
A[C2] of maximum length decreasing with respect to ≻ that contains p. Let C
′
2 be the set
of candidates contained in this maximum decreasing subsequence. In this way, we obtain a
selection of candidates C ′1 ∪ C
′
2 (of maximum cardinality) such that ≻ [C
′
1 ∪ C
′
2] is single-
peaked and p is top-ranked in ≻ [C ′1 ∪C
′
2]. We repeat this step for all p ∈ C in order to find
the candidate for which |C ′1 ∪C
′
2| is maximal; let d(≻) denote number of required deletions
for vote ≻, i.e., d(≻) = m− |C ′1 ∪ C
′
2|. We return LCD(P) = max≻∈P d(≻).
Since finding a longest increasing subsequence in sequences of length m can be done in
time O(m · logm) (Schensted, 1961) and we have to do this 2m times per vote, we obtain
the claimed runtime.
Theorem 6.21. Global Swaps Single-Peaked Evaluation as well as Local Swaps
Single-Peaked Evaluation can be solved in time O(n ·m3).
Proof. Both algorithms rely on the minswaps(≻, A) procedure, which computes the minimal
number of swaps required to make vote ≻ single-peaked with respect to A. Let us first
describe how this procedure is used and later on give a precise description of minswaps. To
solve Global Swaps Single-Peaked Evaluation it suffices to execute for each ≻ in P
the procedure minswaps(≻, A) and sum over all returned values. If the sum does not exceed
the limit k we know that the profile is k-global swaps single-peaked consistent with respect
to A. For the Local Swaps Single-Peaked Evaluation the procedure is similar. Here,
we check for every ≻ in P whether minswaps(≻, A) ≤ k.
Let us now describe how minswaps(≻, A) can be implemented via dynamic programming.
In the following, let sw(ci,≻
′) be the minimum number of swaps required to move ci to the
last position in ≻′, i.e., if if there are k candidates ranked below ci then sw(ci,≻
′) = k.
To simplify notation, we assume without loss of generality that A is c1 > c2 > · · · > cm.
For 0 ≤ i < j ≤ m+ 1 let s(i, j) be the minimal number of swaps required to transform a
vote ≻ into a vote ≻′ such that ci ≻
′ ci−1 ≻
′ · · · ≻′ c1 as well as cj ≻
′ cj+1 ≻
′ · · · ≻′ cm,
and all candidates in {ci+1, . . . , cj−1} are ranked above all other candidates. Observe that
s(i, i + 1) is the number of swaps required to make ≻ single-peaked with respect to A
such that ci is the peak. Thus, once we have values for s(i, i + 1) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we
can compute the number of swaps required to make ≻ single-peaked with respect to A as
mini∈{0,...,m} s(i, i+ 1). Thus, minswaps(≻, A) returns mini∈{0,...,m} s(i, i+ 1).
The quantity s(i, j) can be computed via dynamic programming. Let s(0,m+1) = 0 and
s(i, j) = min(s(i− 1, j) + sw(ci,≻ [{ci, . . . , cj−1}]),
s(i, j + 1) + sw(cj ,≻ [{ci+1, . . . , cj}])),
i.e., to compute s(i, j) we can either start with s(i−1, j) and move ci below ci+1, . . . , cj−1, or
we start with s(i, j+1) and move cj below ci+1, . . . , cj−1. In both cases ci ≻
′ ci−1 ≻
′ · · · ≻′ c1
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as well as cj ≻
′ cj+1 ≻
′ · · · ≻′ cm, and the candidates in {ci+1, . . . , cj−1} are ranked above all
other candidates – as we intend it to be. We choose the option which requires fewer swaps.
Note that s(i, j) has to be computed for O(m2) values, which can be done inO(m3) time.
Consequently, minswaps can be computed inO(m3) time. We conclude thatGlobal Swaps
Single-Peaked Evaluation as well as Local Swaps Single-Peaked Evaluation can
be solved in time O(n ·m3).
Proposition 6.22. Candidate Partition Single-Peaked Evaluation can be solved
in time O(n ·m).
Proof. Let C1, . . . , Ck+1 be the given partition of C. We can solve this problem in O(n ·
m) time by verifying whether P[Ci] is single-peaked with respect to A[Ci] for every i ∈
{1, . . . , k + 1}.
Finally, one can show that the polynomial-time algorithms solving Clones Single-
Peaked Consistency and Width Single-Peaked Consistency (Elkind et al., 2012;
Cornaz et al., 2013) are also applicable to the corresponding evaluation problems and main-
tain their time bounds; the argument for this is similar to the one of Proposition 6.17.
7. Conclusions and Open Questions
In this work, we have investigated notions of nearly single-peakedness. We have introduced
three new notions of nearly single-peakedness and have studied in addition six already
established notions. We have drawn a complete picture of the relations between these no-
tions. For five notions we have shown that deciding nearly single-peaked consistency is
NP-complete and for k-candidate deletion we have presented a polynomial-time algorithm.
Furthermore, we have analyzed the complexity of the evaluation problem, i.e., the veri-
fication task, where the axis is given as additional input. In contrast to consistency, all
evaluation problems can be decided in polynomial time. We refer the reader to Table 2 for
an overview.
An obvious direction for future work is to determine the complexity of Candidate
Partition Single-Peaked Consistency. Also, we want to remark that all notions of
nearly single-peakedness presented in this work are not restricted to single-peakedness, but
can also be applied to other domain restrictions (such as the single-crossing restriction).
NP-completeness, as we have obtained for several consistency problems, does not rule
out the possibility of algorithms that perform well in practice. One approach is to search
for fixed-parameter algorithms, i.e., an algorithm with runtime f(k) · poly(n) for some
computable function f depending only on parameter k. A first fixed-parameter algorithm
for Voter Deletion Single-Peaked Consistency is mentioned by Bredereck et al.
(2016). Another approach is the development of approximation algorithms since nearly
single-peaked consistency can also be seen as an optimization problem. A detailed treat-
ment of both fpt- and approximation-results for Candidate Deletion and Voter Deletion
was presented recently for several domain restrictions including single-peakedness (Elkind
& Lackner, 2014). The design of fixed-parameter and approximation algorithms for the
remaining notions of nearly single-peakedness deserves further attention.
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Notion SP-Consistency SP-Evaluation
k-Voter Deletion NP-c (Thm. 6.4) in P (Prop. 6.18)
k-Local Candidate Deletion NP-c (Thm. 6.7) in P (Thm. 6.20)
k-Additional Axes NP-c (Thm. 6.5) in P (Prop. 6.19)
k-Global Swaps NP-c (Thm. 6.9) in P (Thm. 6.21)
k-Local Swaps NP-c (Thm. 6.8) in P (Thm. 6.21)
k-Candidate Deletion in P (Thm. 6.16) in P (Prop. 6.17)
k-Clones in P (Elkind et al., 2012) in P (Elkind et al., 2012)
k-Width in P (Cornaz et al., 2013) in P (Cornaz et al., 2013)
k-Candidate Partition open in P (Prop. 6.22)
Table 2: Complexity results for different notions of nearly single-peakedness.
Another interesting direction for future work is extending our models to manipulative
behavior, such as manipulation, control, and bribery. That is, assuming we have a nearly
single-peaked electorate according to one of our notions, how computationally expensive is
a manipulative action under a certain voting rule? The analysis of manipulation and control
in such elections has already been started for some distance measures. In a first step, ma-
nipulation and control was introduced in the context of nearly single-peaked elections under
several voting rules, pinpointing that under some voting rules even the presence of only one
maverick can raise the complexity of manipulative actions from P to NP-completeness (Fal-
iszewski et al., 2014). In a second step, dichotomy results for manipulation of k-approval
and k-veto under nearly single-peaked elections were achieved identifying the exact bor-
ders of tractability (Erde´lyi et al., 2015). Still, the impact of nearly single-peakedness on
manipulative behavior is far from being fully understood.
Finally, there might be further useful and natural distance measures regarding single-
peakedness to be found. In particular, for practical purposes it may be useful to combine
distance measures. For example, for a real-world preference data set two axes may be
sufficient if in addition a small number of swaps is allowed. Computing distances of this
sort would be require to define how to weigh measures against each other, e.g., how does
an additional axis compare to 10 swaps? In addition, practical considerations have to
be made to decide which distance measures are useful to combine. The aforementioned
combination of Global Swaps and Additional Axes may be useful since it allows to correct
minor disturbances in the preferences (“noise”) but also take a segregation of voters into
account (e.g., there are two issues that are deemed important; every voter gives preference
to one and orders the candidates accordingly). The hardness results obtained in this paper
do not necessarily transfer to consistency problems for such “mixed” distance measures.
These thoughts do not only apply to the single-peaked restriction but also to other domain
restrictions such as the single-crossing or more-dimensional analogues of single-peakedness.
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Appendix A. Correctness of the Place Procedure
Lemma 6.13. Let (C,P) be an election. If the iterative application of place yields an axis A,
then (C,P) is single-peaked with respect to A. If at some point place returns inconsistent,
then (C,P) is not single-peaked.
Proof. Let us assume towards a contradiction that the iterative application of place yields
an axis A, but (C,P) is not single-peaked with respect to A. By Lemma 4.2, there exists
a vote ≻ in P and ci, cj , ck ∈ C such that ci > cj > ck on A, ci ≻ cj and ck ≻ cj . Let us
consider the step in the algorithm at which the last element of {ci, cj , ck} is placed. Let A
′
be the incomplete axis at this point with boundary(A′) = (b′1, b1, b2, b
′
2). We assume that
the election is single-peaked with respect to A′, i.e., we consider the earliest step at which
place makes a mistake. Before we start with the proof, we prove the following useful claim.
Claim A. Let A′ be an incomplete axis with boundary(A′) = (b′1, b1, b2, b
′
2) and ≻ is single-
peaked with respect to A′. If for some c, c′ it holds that c ≻ c′ and c > c′ ≥ b1 (i.e., c
′ might
be the same candidate as b1), then b
′
1 ≻ b1. Analogously, if c ≻ c
′ and b2 ≥ c
′ > c, then
b′2 ≻ b2.
Proof. We prove the first statement; the second one is analogous. Note that if c = b′1 then
c′ = b1 and the statement is immediate. So assume that c 6= b1. Since c > c
′ ≥ b′1 > b1,
c ≻ c′ and b1 ≻ b
′
1 contradict single-peakedness.
To disprove our assumption that (C,P) is not single-peaked with respect to A, let us
distinguish the following cases.
• ci has been placed last: When placing ci, it holds that b2 ≥ cj > ck on A
′. Since
ck ≻ cj, Claim A implies that b
′
2 ≻ b2. However if b
′
2 ≻ b2 and ci ≻ cj  b2, then
by Case 4 place returns inconsistent, a contradiction to our assumption that place
returns an axis. The case that ck is placed last is symmetric.
• cj has been placed last: It is not possible that b1 ≻ cj and b2 ≻ cj since cj would
have been placed at an earlier point (cf. Case 3a). Thus either cj ≻ b1 or cj ≻ b2. If
cj ≻ b1, then by Claim A b
′
1 ≻ b1; if cj ≻ b2, then by Claim A b
′
2 ≻ b2. Hence by Case
4 place returns inconsistent.
• {ci, cj} have been placed last: Let us first prove that b2 ≻ cj . If b2 = ck, then
b2 = ck ≻ cj . If b2 6= ck and cj ≻ b2, then ck ≻ b2 and by Claim A b
′
2 ≻ b2. Thus
by Case 4 place would return inconsistent, a contradiction. We have shown that
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b2 ≻ cj . But if b2 ≻ cj and ci ≻ cj (by assumption), then by Case 2c cj has to be
placed next to b1 and ci next to b2, and hence cj > ci > ck on A. This contradicts
our assumption that ci > cj > ck on A. The case that {cj , ck} are placed last is
symmetric.
We conclude that (C,P) is single-peaked with respect to A.
Now we show that if place returns inconsistent, then (C,P) is not single-peaked. Let
A′ be an incomplete axis, let C ′ be the candidates already placed on A′ and let X the
set of candidates to be placed next, i.e., X = L(P, C \ C ′). Assume that place(A′,X)
returns inconsistent. We consider all cases where place returns inconsistent and show
that (C,P) is not single-peaked consistent. Since we have already shown that the iterative
application of place yields a single-peaked axis, we can assume that P[C ′] is single-peaked
with respect to A′.
• Case 1: It follows from Lemma 4.3 and 4.4 that (C,P) is not single-peaked consistent.
• Case 4: Let ≻1 be the vote under consideration with b
′
1 ≻1 b1 and x ≻1 b1. Let us
consider the step when b1 was placed; the incomplete axis at this point was of the
form · · · > b′1 > ⋆ > · · · . Since b
′
1 ≻i b1 and b1 was placed next to b
′
1, we know that
Case 2d occurred. (If Case 3 had been applicable then b′1 ≻i b1 would imply that b1
is placed on the right-hand side and not next to b′1.) Let y be the second candidate
that was placed at this step. Since the profile is single-peaked with respect to the
incomplete axis A′, we know that b′1 ≻1 b1 ≻1 y. Since b1 was placed at this step,
there has to be a vote ≻2 with y ≻2 b1. Furthermore, it has to hold that either x ≻2 y
or x ≻2 b1 since x was not placed at this step. Finally, b1 ≻2 b
′
1 has to hold, because
otherwise the profile would not be single-peaked with respect to A′. To sum up, we
have b′1 ≻1 b1 ≻ y and x ≻1 b1 as well as y ≻2 b1 ≻2 b
′
1 and x ≻2 b1. It is straight-
forward to verify that this subprofile is not single-peaked; indeed, this is one of the
forbidden subprofiles occurring in the single-peakedness characterization by Ballester
and Haeringer (2011). Hence by Lemma 4.3 the full profile is not single-peaked.
• The procedure may also return inconsistent if a candidate x1 has to be placed
both left and right. This occurs if (i) Case 2c occurs once as stated and once with
x1 and x2 interchanged, (ii) Case 2d occurs once as stated and once with x1 and x2
interchanged, (iii) both Case 2c and 2d occur, and (iv) both Case 2c and 2d occur with
x1 and x2 interchanged. We first handle (i); the argument for (ii) is analogous. Let
L(P, C ′) = {x1, x2}. Assume that there exists a vote ≻1 with b2 ≻1 x1 and x2 ≻1 x1
(Case 2c). Further there exists a vote ≻2 with b2 ≻2 x2 and x1 ≻2 x2. Since b2 has
been placed at an earlier step, there exists a vote ≻3 where x1 ≻3 b2 and x2 ≻3 b2.
This proves that the profile is not single-peaked via Lemma 4.4.
Let us now consider (iii); the argument for (iv) is analogous. There exists a vote ≻1
with b2 ≻1 x1 and x2 ≻1 x1 (Case 2c). Since b1 and b2 have been placed before x1
and x2, either b1 or b2 has to be ranked below both x1 and x2. Thus it has to hold
that x2 ≻1 x1 ≻1 b1. Also, there exists a vote ≻2 exists with b1 ≻2 x1 and x2 ≻2 x1
(Case 2d) and by the same argument as before x2 ≻2 x1 ≻2 b2. It is straight-forward
to show that this subprofile is not single-peaked; indeed, it is equivalent to the one we
encountered when we dealt with Case 4. Hence the full profile is not single-peaked.
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• Let us consider contradictions that can arise in Case 3. Recall from the algorithm
description that a contradiction can only arise if x is not the last candidate to be
placed. Let y 6= x be some candidate not yet placed. It has to hold that y ≻ x in
all votes. Let ≻1 be a vote with b2 ≻1 x. Since both b1 and b2 have been placed
before x, we infer that b2 ≻1 x ≻1 b1. Further let ≻2 be a vote with b1 ≻2 x and
hence b1 ≻2 x ≻2 b2. Considering the votes ≻1,≻2 and candidates {x, y, b1, b2}, we
encounter the same subprofile as in the previous step.
This concludes the correctness proof of the place procedure.
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